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The Self-Defense Corps (SDC), the precursor to the PF, was well-trained and equipped with modern weaponry in the mid-1950s.
Answer: False
Explanation: In the mid-1950s, the Self-Defense Corps (SDC), the precursor to the Popular Force, was characterized by inadequate training and outdated weaponry, possessing approximately two weapons for every three members, predominantly obsolete French rifles.
By late 1958, the Self-Defense Corps showed significant improvement in training and equipment following U.S. support and offered assistance.
Answer: False
Explanation: Despite U.S. support and offered assistance, the Self-Defense Corps exhibited minimal improvement by late 1958, with persistent deficiencies noted in training facilities and equipment.
The Popular Force was established before the 1963 South Vietnamese coup.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Popular Force was established subsequent to, not prior to, the 1963 South Vietnamese coup, emerging from the consolidation of the Self-Defense Corps and other paramilitary units.
General Samuel Tankersley Williams argued against continued U.S. support for the Self-Defense Corps in late 1957.
Answer: False
Explanation: In late 1957, General Samuel Tankersley Williams advocated strongly in favor of continued U.S. support for the Self-Defense Corps, proposing its expansion and improvement.
What was the precursor to the South Vietnamese Popular Force?
Answer: The Self-Defense Corps (SDC)
Explanation: The Self-Defense Corps (SDC) served as the precursor organization to the South Vietnamese Popular Force.
According to a 1957 survey, what was the state of the Self-Defense Corps' equipment?
Answer: Possessed approximately two weapons for every three members, mostly obsolete French rifles.
Explanation: A 1957 survey indicated that the Self-Defense Corps' equipment was deficient, with approximately two weapons available for every three members, predominantly consisting of obsolete French rifles.
What assessment did American police experts make of the Self-Defense Corps' capability against organized Viet Cong units in 1957?
Answer: Virtually null capability to withstand assaults by armed and organized Viet Cong units.
Explanation: In 1957, American police experts assessed the Self-Defense Corps' capability to withstand assaults by armed and organized Viet Cong units as virtually null, highlighting its severe limitations.
Which issue did General Williams identify in late 1958 as handicapping training for the Self-Defense Corps?
Answer: Inadequate firing ranges and deficient training aids.
Explanation: In late 1958, General Williams identified inadequate firing ranges and deficient training aids as critical issues handicapping the training of the Self-Defense Corps.
The Self-Defense Corps was described as notoriously ineffective and heavily infiltrated by what group in the late 1950s?
Answer: Communists
Explanation: In the late 1950s, the Self-Defense Corps was described as notoriously ineffective and heavily infiltrated by Communists.
The Popular Force was formed shortly after which significant event in South Vietnamese history?
Answer: The 1963 South Vietnamese coup
Explanation: The Popular Force was formed shortly after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup.
The South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) functioned primarily as a full-time military unit responsible for provincial-level operations.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Popular Force (PF) was fundamentally a part-time local militia tasked with village defense, distinct from the full-time Regional Force (RF) which operated at the provincial level.
The Vietnamese name for the South Vietnamese Popular Force was 'Nghĩa quân'.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Vietnamese designation for the South Vietnamese Popular Force was indeed 'Nghĩa quân'.
American Forces commonly referred to the South Vietnamese Popular Force using the nickname 'Ruff-Puffs'.
Answer: True
Explanation: The designation 'Ruff-Puffs' was a common informal appellation used by American Forces for the South Vietnamese Popular Force.
What was the primary mission of the South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF)?
Answer: To protect villages and homes from enemy attacks.
Explanation: The primary mission of the South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) was the protection of villages and homes within South Vietnam.
Which Vietnamese name corresponds to the South Vietnamese Popular Force?
Answer: Nghĩa quân
Explanation: The Vietnamese name corresponding to the South Vietnamese Popular Force is 'Nghĩa quân'.
What was the stated goal of General William Westmoreland's plan to expand the Popular Force in 1965?
Answer: To free up regular ARVN forces for offensive operations.
Explanation: General William Westmoreland's 1965 plan to expand the Popular Force aimed to free up regular ARVN forces for deployment in offensive operations.
The Popular Force and Regional Force units together were responsible for inflicting approximately 10% of the total PAVN/VC casualties during the Vietnam War.
Answer: False
Explanation: Collectively, the Popular Force and Regional Force units were responsible for inflicting an estimated 30% of the total PAVN/VC casualties throughout the course of the Vietnam War.
The PF and Regional Force units were particularly effective in roles such as ambush, reconnaissance, and detection compared to larger conventional forces.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Popular Force and Regional Force units demonstrated particular efficacy in specialized roles, including ambush, reconnaissance, and detection, often outperforming larger, less agile conventional forces in these capacities.
Desertion rates for the Self-Defense Corps/Popular Force decreased significantly between 1962 and 1965.
Answer: False
Explanation: Desertion rates for the Self-Defense Corps/Popular Force did not decrease; rather, they increased substantially between 1962 and 1965, indicating significant personnel attrition.
The Joint General Staff (JGS) prohibited the enlistment of 17-30 year olds into the Popular Forces, contributing to recruiting difficulties.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Joint General Staff (JGS) imposed restrictions on enlistment, specifically prohibiting individuals aged 17-30 from joining the Popular Forces, which consequently exacerbated recruiting challenges.
In October 1967, the Popular Forces were primarily armed with modern M16 rifles and M60 machine guns.
Answer: False
Explanation: In October 1967, the Popular Forces were primarily equipped with carbines and older Browning automatic rifles, rather than modern M16 rifles and M60 machine guns.
In October 1967, MACV estimated that over 2,000 Popular Forces platoons were directly supporting the revolutionary development effort.
Answer: False
Explanation: In October 1967, MACV estimated that 754 Popular Forces platoons, not over 2,000, were directly supporting the revolutionary development effort.
What percentage of total PAVN/VC casualties were inflicted by the PF and Regional Force units?
Answer: Approximately 30%
Explanation: The combined efforts of the Popular Force and Regional Force units were responsible for inflicting approximately 30% of the total PAVN/VC casualties.
Which of the following roles were PF and Regional Force units particularly adept at?
Answer: Ambushes, reconnaissance, and detection.
Explanation: PF and Regional Force units demonstrated particular adeptness in roles such as ambushes, reconnaissance, and detection.
What significant personnel issue plagued the Self-Defense Corps/Popular Force between 1962 and 1965?
Answer: High rates of desertion.
Explanation: High rates of desertion constituted a significant personnel issue plaguing the Self-Defense Corps/Popular Force between 1962 and 1965.
In early 1968, what was the primary disadvantage of the territorial forces' small arms compared to PAVN/VC forces?
Answer: They were Korean War-era weapons, leaving the forces outgunned.
Explanation: The primary disadvantage of the territorial forces' small arms in early 1968 was their Korean War-era origin, which rendered them outgunned by the PAVN/VC.
Which factor contributed to recruiting difficulties for the Popular Forces?
Answer: A ban on enlisting individuals aged 17-30 by the JGS.
Explanation: A contributing factor to recruiting difficulties for the Popular Forces was the JGS's prohibition on enlisting individuals aged 17-30.
What specific weapons were the Popular Forces primarily armed with in October 1967?
Answer: Carbines and older Browning automatic rifles.
Explanation: In October 1967, the Popular Forces were primarily armed with carbines and older Browning automatic rifles.
What was the estimated number of Popular Forces platoons directly supporting the revolutionary development effort in October 1967?
Answer: 754
Explanation: In October 1967, MACV estimated that 754 Popular Forces platoons were directly supporting the revolutionary development effort.
What was the monthly desertion rate for the Popular Forces during the first six months of 1966?
Answer: 27.0 per 1,000
Explanation: During the first six months of 1966, the monthly desertion rate for the Popular Forces was recorded at 27.0 per 1,000 personnel.
The province chiefs typically controlled Regional Forces companies, while district and village chiefs directed Popular Forces platoons.
Answer: True
Explanation: The command structure generally placed Regional Forces companies under the control of province chiefs, while district and village chiefs were responsible for directing Popular Forces platoons.
The JGS consolidated the 37 Popular Forces training camps into 19 camps in 1968 to improve training infrastructure.
Answer: True
Explanation: In 1968, the Joint General Staff (JGS) undertook a consolidation of the Popular Forces training infrastructure, reducing the number of camps from 37 to 19.
The Popular Force was integrated into the regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) command structure in 1970.
Answer: True
Explanation: The integration of the Popular Force into the regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) command structure was completed in 1970.
Province and district military staffs were generally unburdened by the management of territorial forces due to their small numbers.
Answer: False
Explanation: Province and district military staffs were frequently overwhelmed by the management of territorial forces, owing to the substantial number of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons they were responsible for.
The regular ARVN showed significant interest in the deployment and operational activities of the territorial forces, providing substantial support.
Answer: False
Explanation: The regular ARVN provided some training and supplies to the territorial forces but generally exhibited little interest in their deployment and operational activities.
What action did the Joint General Staff (JGS) take in 1966 to increase ARVN control over territorial forces?
Answer: Transformed the territorial command into a directorate of the JGS.
Explanation: In 1966, the Joint General Staff (JGS) took action to increase ARVN control over territorial forces by transforming the territorial command into a directorate of the JGS and establishing dedicated staff sections within Corps headquarters.
How did the regular ARVN generally view the deployment and operational activities of the territorial forces?
Answer: With little interest, despite providing some training and supplies.
Explanation: The regular ARVN generally displayed little interest in the deployment and operational activities of the territorial forces, notwithstanding the provision of some training and supplies.
What administrative change did the JGS implement in 1968 concerning Popular Forces training camps?
Answer: Reduced the number of camps from 37 to 19 and consolidated them.
Explanation: In 1968, the JGS implemented an administrative change by reducing the number of Popular Forces training camps from 37 to 19 and consolidating them.
What was the role of U.S. Army captains as territorial advisors?
Answer: Province Territorial Forces advisers, working on command and administration.
Explanation: U.S. Army captains served as Province Territorial Forces advisers, focusing their efforts on improving command, administration, and supply systems.
What did the JGS do in 1966 to improve ARVN control over territorial forces?
Answer: Created separate staff sections for Territorial Forces within each Corps headquarters.
Explanation: In 1966, the JGS improved ARVN control over territorial forces by creating separate staff sections for Territorial Forces within each Corps headquarters and transforming the territorial command into a directorate of the JGS.
The Combined Action Program (CAP) involved integrating a U.S. Marine rifle squad, a Navy Corpsman, and a Popular Force platoon for hamlet security.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Combined Action Program (CAP) was characterized by the integration of a U.S. Marine rifle squad, a U.S. Navy Corpsman, and a Popular Force platoon, specifically for the purpose of enhancing hamlet security.
The Combined Action Program (CAP) reached its peak operational strength in January 1970 with approximately 50 Combined Action Platoons.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Combined Action Program (CAP) attained its peak operational strength in January 1970, but this peak comprised approximately 114 Combined Action Platoons, not 50.
Following the Tet Offensive in February 1968, General Westmoreland requested modern weaponry for territorial forces because their existing arms were outdated.
Answer: True
Explanation: Subsequent to the Tet Offensive in February 1968, General Westmoreland requested modern weaponry for territorial forces, citing the inadequacy of their existing Korean War-era arms against PAVN/VC equipment.
The Combined Action Program (CAP) was primarily instituted by which branch of the U.S. military in I Corps?
Answer: U.S. Marines
Explanation: The Combined Action Program (CAP) in I Corps was primarily instituted by the U.S. Marines.
What was the peak number of Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) in operation?
Answer: 114
Explanation: The Combined Action Program (CAP) reached its peak operational strength with 114 Combined Action Platoons.
Which of the following was listed as a key engagement involving the South Vietnamese Popular Force?
Answer: The Tet Offensive
Explanation: The Tet Offensive was listed as a key engagement involving the South Vietnamese Popular Force.
The Popular Force resembled the local force and village-guerrilla component of the Viet Cong in its role and structure.
Answer: True
Explanation: The organizational structure and operational role of the Popular Force bore significant resemblance to the local force and village-guerrilla components of the Viet Cong.
The Popular Forces were primarily involved in static defense roles, similar to the Viet Cong's village guerrilla component.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Popular Forces primarily engaged in static defense roles, mirroring the function of the Viet Cong's village guerrilla component.
How did the Popular Force (PF) differ from the Regional Force (RF) in South Vietnam?
Answer: The PF was a part-time local militia for village defense, while the RF was a full-time force for provincial operations.
Explanation: The Popular Force (PF) functioned as a part-time local militia dedicated to village defense, whereas the Regional Force (RF) constituted a full-time military contingent operating at the provincial level.
In 1965, General William Westmoreland planned to decrease the size of the Popular Force to allow more ARVN units to focus on offensive operations.
Answer: False
Explanation: In 1965, General William Westmoreland's plan involved expanding, not decreasing, the size of the Popular Force, with the objective of freeing up regular ARVN units for offensive operations.
In 1972, the Popular Forces budget constituted nearly 20% of the total South Vietnamese defense budget.
Answer: False
Explanation: In 1972, the budget allocated to the Popular Forces represented approximately 4.5% of the total South Vietnamese defense budget.
General Westmoreland adjusted his expansion plans for the Popular Forces downwards in June 1966 due to successful recruitment drives.
Answer: False
Explanation: In June 1966, General Westmoreland adjusted his expansion plans for the Popular Forces downwards due to high desertion rates and recruiting shortfalls, not successful recruitment drives.
The JGS proposed expanding the Popular Forces to nearly 3,000 platoons in 1969 to alleviate ARVN area security missions.
Answer: True
Explanation: In 1969, the JGS proposed expanding the Popular Forces to a total of 2,869 platoons, with the aim of relieving ARVN regular forces from area security duties.
What was the approximate percentage of the total defense budget allocated to the Popular Forces in 1972?
Answer: 4.5%
Explanation: In 1972, the Popular Forces received approximately 4.5% of the total South Vietnamese defense budget.
What was the net change in Popular Forces strength during 1965?
Answer: A net loss of approximately 25,000 troops.
Explanation: During 1965, the Popular Forces experienced a net loss of approximately 25,000 troops, primarily due to casualties and desertions, reducing their numbers to about 135,000 by the end of the year.
The JGS proposed expanding the Popular Forces to a total of how many platoons in 1969?
Answer: 2,869
Explanation: In 1969, the JGS proposed expanding the Popular Forces to a total of 2,869 platoons.