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The Civil Guard, the precursor to the Regional Forces, was established in 1964.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Civil Guard, the precursor to the Regional Forces, was initially established in April 1955.
The Civil Guard was initially under the command of the Ministry of Defense.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Civil Guard was initially under the direct control of the President of South Vietnam, not the Ministry of Defense.
A six-week civil guard course was instituted in 1955 in anticipation of the withdrawal of French forces and the potential for renewed hostilities.
Answer: True
Explanation: A six-week civil guard course was instituted in 1955 in anticipation of the withdrawal of French forces and the potential for renewed hostilities.
A 1957 survey indicated that the Civil Guard was well-equipped and highly trained, yet suffered from poor discipline.
Answer: False
Explanation: A 1957 survey indicated that the Civil Guard was generally poorly equipped and inadequately trained, although it did suffer from poor discipline.
The Civil Guard was designed as a static, part-time force, in contrast to the more mobile Self-Defense Corps.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Civil Guard was designed as a more mobile, full-time force, unlike the static, part-time Self-Defense Corps.
President Ngô Đình Diệm envisioned the Civil Guard as a lightly armed territorial police force.
Answer: False
Explanation: President Ngô Đình Diệm envisioned the Civil Guard as a more robust force, capable of assisting the army, rather than a lightly armed territorial police force.
The South Vietnamese government proposed arming the Civil Guard solely with small arms and basic patrol vehicles.
Answer: False
Explanation: The South Vietnamese government proposed arming the Civil Guard with artillery, light tanks, scout cars, half-tracks, and helicopters, not just small arms and patrol vehicles.
By early 1960, the Civil Guard's command structure was highly centralized, featuring strong control from national headquarters in Saigon.
Answer: False
Explanation: By early 1960, the Civil Guard's national headquarters in Saigon exercised little effective control over its widely dispersed units.
A January 1961 counterinsurgency plan proposed the expansion of the Civil Guard and the transfer of its control to the Ministry of Defense.
Answer: True
Explanation: A January 1961 counterinsurgency plan proposed the expansion of the Civil Guard and the transfer of its control to the Ministry of Defense.
What was the original designation of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces?
Answer: Civil Guard
Explanation: The original designation of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces was the Civil Guard.
When was the Civil Guard, the precursor to the Regional Forces, initially established?
Answer: April 1955
Explanation: The Civil Guard, the precursor to the Regional Forces, was initially established in April 1955.
What was the initial primary duty assigned to the Civil Guard upon its formation?
Answer: To relieve regular ARVN forces of internal security tasks.
Explanation: The initial primary duty assigned to the Civil Guard upon its formation was to relieve regular ARVN forces of internal security tasks.
Under whose direct control did the Civil Guard initially function?
Answer: The President of South Vietnam
Explanation: The Civil Guard initially functioned under the direct control of the President of South Vietnam.
What was the primary rationale cited for the institution of a civil guard course in 1955?
Answer: To prepare for the withdrawal of French forces and potential renewed hostilities.
Explanation: The primary rationale cited for the institution of a civil guard course in 1955 was to prepare for the withdrawal of French forces and the potential for renewed hostilities.
According to a 1957 survey, what constituted a significant issue with South Vietnam's paramilitary forces, such as the Civil Guard?
Answer: They were inadequately trained and poorly equipped.
Explanation: According to a 1957 survey, a significant issue with South Vietnam's paramilitary forces, including the Civil Guard, was that they were inadequately trained and poorly equipped.
How did the Civil Guard's operational character differ from that of the Self-Defense Corps?
Answer: The Civil Guard was armed, uniformed, and full-time, designed for patrolling, unlike the static Self-Defense Corps.
Explanation: The Civil Guard's operational character differed from the Self-Defense Corps as it was armed, uniformed, and full-time, designed for patrolling, unlike the static Self-Defense Corps.
What was the U.S. Operations Mission's perception of the South Vietnamese government's proposal to equip the Civil Guard with artillery, tanks, and helicopters?
Answer: Confirmation that Diệm intended to use the Civil Guard as a private army.
Explanation: The U.S. Operations Mission perceived the proposal to equip the Civil Guard with heavy weaponry as confirmation that Diệm intended to use it as a private army.
By early 1960, what constituted a significant issue with the Civil Guard's command structure?
Answer: National headquarters in Saigon exercised little effective control.
Explanation: By early 1960, a significant issue with the Civil Guard's command structure was that national headquarters in Saigon exercised little effective control.
Following the 1963 coup, the Civil Guard was reorganized into the Popular Forces.
Answer: False
Explanation: Following the 1963 coup, the Civil Guard was reorganized into the Regional Forces (RF), while the Self-Defense Corps formed the Popular Forces (PF).
General Westmoreland's 1965 plan to expand the Regional Force aimed to liberate ARVN regular forces for offensive operations.
Answer: True
Explanation: General Westmoreland's 1965 plan to expand the Regional Force aimed to liberate ARVN regular forces from local security duties for offensive operations.
When did the Regional Forces undergo integration into the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) structure?
Answer: 1964
Explanation: The Regional Forces underwent integration into the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) structure in 1964.
How were the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps reorganized subsequent to the 1963 South Vietnamese coup?
Answer: Civil Guard became Regional Forces; Self-Defense Corps became Popular Forces.
Explanation: Subsequent to the 1963 coup, the Civil Guard was reorganized into the Regional Forces, and the Self-Defense Corps was consolidated to form the Popular Forces.
What was General Westmoreland's objective in expanding the Regional Force in 1965?
Answer: To free up ARVN regular forces from local security duties for offensive operations.
Explanation: General Westmoreland's objective in expanding the Regional Force in 1965 was to free up ARVN regular forces from local security duties for offensive operations.
What was the general command structure for the Regional Forces and Popular Forces following the 1963 coup, prior to their full integration with ARVN?
Answer: They were placed under the Joint General Staff (JGS) with province chiefs commanding RF companies.
Explanation: Following the 1963 coup, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces were placed under the Joint General Staff (JGS), with province chiefs generally commanding Regional Forces companies.
The Regional Forces were recruited from outside the local provinces where they were stationed.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Regional Forces were recruited locally from the provinces in which they operated.
In mid-June 1965, the Regional Forces comprised solely rifle companies.
Answer: False
Explanation: In mid-June 1965, the Regional Forces comprised rifle companies, mechanized platoons, boat companies, and other support units, not solely rifle companies.
In 1966, the Joint General Staff (JGS) established distinct staff sections for Territorial Forces within each Corps headquarters.
Answer: True
Explanation: In 1966, the Joint General Staff (JGS) established distinct staff sections for Territorial Forces within each Corps headquarters to oversee province and district security forces.
By mid-1972, the Regional Forces possessed a paper strength of approximately 130,000 personnel.
Answer: False
Explanation: By mid-1972, the paper strength of the Regional Forces had reached approximately 300,646 personnel, not 130,000.
The Regional Forces were organized into units including rifle companies, mechanized platoons, and boat companies.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Regional Forces were organized into units including rifle companies, mechanized platoons, and boat companies, among others.
Province chiefs generally exercised command over the Popular Forces platoons within their provinces.
Answer: False
Explanation: Province chiefs generally exercised command over the Regional Forces companies within their provinces, while district and village chiefs directed Popular Forces platoons.
By October 1967, Regional Forces companies were equipped with M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers.
Answer: False
Explanation: By October 1967, Regional Forces companies were equipped with carbines, machine guns, and M79 grenade launchers, but M16 rifles were not yet standard issue for all units.
The Regional Forces comprised 24 riverine companies, predominantly stationed in the Mekong Delta.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Regional Forces comprised 24 riverine companies, predominantly stationed in the Mekong Delta, equipped for waterway operations.
What organizational development transpired in 1971 to enhance Regional Forces command and control?
Answer: Creation of more Regional Forces battalion headquarters.
Explanation: In 1971, the creation of more Regional Forces battalion headquarters transpired to enhance command and control structures.
By mid-1972, what was the paper strength of the Regional Forces?
Answer: Approximately 300,000
Explanation: By mid-1972, the paper strength of the Regional Forces had reached approximately 300,000 personnel.
What was the purpose of the 24 riverine companies comprising the Regional Forces structure?
Answer: To control waterways and support operations in riverine areas like the Mekong Delta.
Explanation: The 24 riverine companies within the Regional Forces structure were purposed to control waterways and support operations in riverine areas, particularly the Mekong Delta.
Which of the following was NOT a unit type that comprised the Regional Forces?
Answer: Airborne assault battalions
Explanation: Airborne assault battalions were not a unit type that comprised the Regional Forces; the forces included rifle companies, mechanized platoons, and boat companies, among others.
The South Vietnamese Regional Forces were primarily tasked with engaging the most heavily equipped Viet Cong Main Force units.
Answer: False
Explanation: The South Vietnamese Regional Forces were primarily tasked with countering Viet Cong Local Force units, thereby enabling ARVN regular forces to engage the better-equipped Viet Cong Main Force units.
The effectiveness of local militia forces, such as the Regional Forces, was diminished by their unfamiliarity with the local terrain.
Answer: False
Explanation: The effectiveness of local militia forces, such as the Regional Forces, was enhanced by their familiarity with the local region and terrain.
Despite challenges such as low remuneration, the Regional Forces demonstrated capability in detecting enemy infiltration and securing civilian areas.
Answer: True
Explanation: Despite challenges such as low remuneration, the Regional Forces exhibited capability in detecting enemy infiltration and securing civilian areas.
The Regional Forces and Popular Forces collectively represented a significant portion, exceeding 20%, of the total Vietnam War budget.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Regional Forces and Popular Forces together accounted for an estimated 2-5% of the total war budget, not over 20%.
The Regional Forces' operational tactics typically involved large-scale, slow-moving conventional warfare.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Regional Forces' operational tactics generally involved small-unit, highly-mobile actions, rather than large-scale, slow-moving conventional warfare.
By October 1967, it was estimated that nearly all Regional Forces companies were actively contributing to the revolutionary development effort.
Answer: False
Explanation: By October 1967, MACV estimated that only a fraction of Regional Forces companies were actively supporting the revolutionary development effort; most were engaged in other activities.
In 1972, the Regional Forces constituted approximately 10% of South Vietnam's total defense budget.
Answer: True
Explanation: In 1972, the Regional Forces constituted approximately 10% of South Vietnam's total defense budget.
What was the principal role of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces within the ARVN?
Answer: Providing territorial defense and maintaining local security.
Explanation: The principal role of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces was to provide territorial defense and maintain local security within their designated areas.
What strategic objective did the establishment of the Regional Forces seek to achieve concerning ARVN regular forces?
Answer: To relieve ARVN regular forces of internal security duties so they could engage VC Main Force units.
Explanation: The establishment of the Regional Forces aimed to relieve ARVN regular forces of internal security duties, thereby enabling them to engage Viet Cong Main Force units.
What factor significantly contributed to the effectiveness of local militia forces, such as the Regional Forces, in guerrilla conflicts?
Answer: Their familiarity with the local region and terrain.
Explanation: The familiarity of local militia forces, such as the Regional Forces, with the local region and terrain significantly contributed to their effectiveness in guerrilla conflicts.
Despite challenges, what key capabilities did the Regional Forces exhibit?
Answer: Detecting enemy infiltration and holding civilian areas.
Explanation: Despite challenges, the Regional Forces demonstrated key capabilities in detecting enemy infiltration and holding civilian areas.
What percentage of casualties inflicted upon enemy forces are the Regional and Popular Forces estimated to have been responsible for, notwithstanding their relatively modest budget allocation?
Answer: Approximately 30%
Explanation: The Regional and Popular Forces are estimated to have been responsible for approximately 30% of enemy casualties, despite their modest budget allocation.
How did the operational tactics employed by the Regional Forces diverge from those of conventional units?
Answer: They were more capable of small-unit, highly-mobile tactics.
Explanation: The Regional Forces diverged from conventional units by being more capable of small-unit, highly-mobile tactics.
What was the estimated operational focus of the majority of Regional Forces companies by October 1967?
Answer: Engaging in training, base defense, or other support activities.
Explanation: By October 1967, the majority of Regional Forces companies were estimated to be engaged in training, base defense, or other support activities, rather than direct revolutionary development efforts.
What was the primary mission of all territorial combat units within the South Vietnamese military structure?
Answer: Local security and defense against enemy incursions.
Explanation: The primary mission of all territorial combat units within the South Vietnamese military structure was local security and defense against enemy incursions.
What was the budgetary allocation for the Regional Forces in 1972 in relation to the total defense budget?
Answer: Approximately 10%
Explanation: In 1972, the budgetary allocation for the Regional Forces represented approximately 10% of South Vietnam's total defense budget.
Michigan State University specialists assisted in establishing a national police academy for the Civil Guard.
Answer: True
Explanation: Michigan State University specialists assisted in establishing a national police academy and training courses for the Civil Guard.
U.S. Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow supported President Diệm's proposal to transfer the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense.
Answer: False
Explanation: U.S. Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow opposed President Diệm's proposal to transfer the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense, advocating it remain a civilian police force.
The U.S. Operations Mission declined to release funds for equipping the Civil Guard due to President Diệm's insistence on arming them with heavy artillery.
Answer: False
Explanation: The U.S. Operations Mission declined to release funds for equipping the Civil Guard primarily because President Diệm insisted on transferring its control to the Ministry of Defense, not due to armament choices.
In January 1959, President Diệm consented to the MAAG overseeing the training of the Civil Guard.
Answer: False
Explanation: In January 1959, President Diệm agreed to let the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission, not the MAAG, handle the training of the Civil Guard.
U.S. military leadership in Washington concurred with Saigon representatives that the Civil Guard should be virtually amalgamated with the ARVN.
Answer: False
Explanation: U.S. military leadership in Washington supported the transfer of the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense, disagreeing with Saigon representatives who feared amalgamation with the ARVN.
Desertion rates for the Civil Guard/Regional Force experienced a significant decrease between 1962 and 1965.
Answer: False
Explanation: Desertion rates for the Civil Guard/Regional Force showed a significant increase between 1962 and 1965.
General Westmoreland froze the authorized force structure of the Regional Forces in June 1966 owing to successful recruitment and low desertion rates.
Answer: False
Explanation: General Westmoreland froze the authorized force structure of the Regional Forces in June 1966 due to high desertion rates and recruiting shortfalls, not successful recruitment.
MACV proposed the establishment of intermediate tactical commands, such as battalion headquarters, to address command and control challenges for the Regional Forces in late 1967.
Answer: True
Explanation: MACV proposed the establishment of intermediate tactical commands, such as battalion headquarters, to address command and control challenges for the Regional Forces in late 1967.
The Territorial Forces advisory effort was deemed highly effective and directly influenced most ground operations.
Answer: False
Explanation: The Territorial Forces advisory effort was considered too small to have a significant impact and primarily focused on supporting weak command structures rather than directly influencing operations.
What role did Michigan State University play in enhancing South Vietnam's security forces?
Answer: They helped establish a national police academy and training courses.
Explanation: Michigan State University played a role in enhancing South Vietnam's security forces by helping to establish a national police academy and training courses.
President Diệm's vision for the Civil Guard contrasted with the views of U.S. advisers primarily concerning:
Answer: The appropriate level of armament and its role as a police or military force.
Explanation: President Diệm's vision for the Civil Guard contrasted with U.S. advisers' views primarily concerning the appropriate level of armament and its role as a police or military force.
Why were U.S. Ambassador Durbrow and USOM chief Barrows apprehensive regarding Diệm's plans for the Civil Guard?
Answer: They feared it would be used to expand military power covertly and circumvent force ceilings.
Explanation: U.S. Ambassador Durbrow and USOM chief Barrows were apprehensive regarding Diệm's plans for the Civil Guard, fearing its potential use for covert military expansion and circumvention of force ceilings.
The U.S. Operations Mission initially declined to release funds for equipping the Civil Guard due to:
Answer: President Diệm insisted on transferring its control to the Ministry of Defense.
Explanation: The U.S. Operations Mission initially declined to release funds for equipping the Civil Guard because President Diệm insisted on transferring its control to the Ministry of Defense.
In January 1959, who did President Diệm agree would assume responsibility for training the Civil Guard?
Answer: The Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission.
Explanation: In January 1959, President Diệm agreed that the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission would assume responsibility for training the Civil Guard.
What was the disagreement between U.S. military leadership in Washington and representatives in Saigon concerning the Civil Guard's control?
Answer: Washington supported transfer to the Ministry of Defense, while Saigon feared amalgamation with ARVN.
Explanation: The disagreement concerned Washington's support for transfer to the Ministry of Defense versus Saigon's fear of amalgamation with the ARVN.
What issue prompted General Westmoreland to freeze the authorized force structure of the Regional Forces in June 1966?
Answer: Excessive desertion rates and recruiting shortfalls.
Explanation: Excessive desertion rates and recruiting shortfalls prompted General Westmoreland to freeze the authorized force structure of the Regional Forces in June 1966.
What command and control challenges did the Regional Forces encounter in late 1967, according to MACV?
Answer: Province and district military staffs were overwhelmed with administrative tasks.
Explanation: In late 1967, province and district military staffs encountered command and control challenges due to being overwhelmed with administrative tasks related to the numerous Regional Forces companies and Popular Forces platoons.
What was the assessment regarding the impact of the Territorial Forces advisory effort?
Answer: It was too small to have a significant impact.
Explanation: The assessment regarding the Territorial Forces advisory effort was that it was too small to have a significant impact.
The Regional Forces were officially disbanded on April 30, 1975, signifying the cessation of their operational activities.
Answer: True
Explanation: The Regional Forces were officially disbanded on April 30, 1975, coinciding with the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the fall of Saigon.
President Diệm's interest in the Civil Guard was principally motivated by his desire to establish a force loyal to him, independent of the army.
Answer: True
Explanation: President Diệm's interest in the Civil Guard was principally motivated by his desire to establish a force loyal to him, independent of the army.
President Diệm's February 1960 directive to form ranger companies was lauded by the U.S. military as a necessary measure.
Answer: False
Explanation: President Diệm's February 1960 directive to form ranger companies was criticized by the U.S. military as 'hasty, ill-considered, and destructive'.
Following the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland requested new equipment for the territorial forces due to their being outgunned by PAVN/VC.
Answer: True
Explanation: Following the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland requested new equipment for the territorial forces because they were still equipped with older small arms and were outgunned by the PAVN/VC.
In 1969, the JGS proposed the conversion of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units into Regional Forces to liberate regular ARVN forces.
Answer: True
Explanation: In 1969, the JGS proposed the conversion of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units into Regional Forces to liberate more regular ARVN forces from area security responsibilities.
From which year were the South Vietnamese Regional Forces active until their disbandment?
Answer: 1955 to 1975
Explanation: The South Vietnamese Regional Forces were active from 1955 until their disbandment on April 30, 1975.
What was a principal political motivation for President Diệm's emphasis on the Civil Guard?
Answer: To create a force loyal to him, countering potential army disloyalty.
Explanation: A principal political motivation for President Diệm's emphasis on the Civil Guard was to create a force loyal to him, countering potential army disloyalty.
What was the U.S. military's reaction to President Diệm's February 1960 directive to form ranger companies?
Answer: They viewed it as hasty, ill-considered, and destructive.
Explanation: The U.S. military's reaction to President Diệm's February 1960 directive to form ranger companies was that it was 'hasty, ill-considered, and destructive'.
Why did General Westmoreland request M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers for territorial forces subsequent to the Tet Offensive?
Answer: Because the territorial forces were still equipped with Korean War-era small arms and were outgunned.
Explanation: General Westmoreland requested M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers for territorial forces after the Tet Offensive because they were still equipped with Korean War-era small arms and were outgunned.
What was the JGS proposal in 1969 pertaining to the Regional Forces and other units?
Answer: To expand the Regional Forces and convert CIDG units into RF.
Explanation: The JGS proposal in 1969 pertained to expanding the Regional Forces and converting Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units into Regional Forces.