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The Bromberg Incident

A scholarly examination of the complex and tragic events in Bydgoszcz during the German invasion of Poland, and their enduring historical debate.

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Overview

A Sequence of Violent Events

Bloody Sunday, known in German as Bromberger Blutsonntag and in Polish as Krwawa niedziela, refers to a series of violent occurrences in Bydgoszcz (German: Bromberg), Poland, between September 3 and 4, 1939. These events transpired during the initial phase of the German invasion of Poland, a period marked by heightened tensions between the city's significant German-speaking minority and its Polish majority.

Escalation and Initial Casualties

As the Wehrmacht prepared its assault on Bydgoszcz on September 3, members of the German minority, collaborating with the German intelligence agency (Abwehr), launched attacks against the Polish garrison. This provocation led to violent reprisals by Polish soldiers and civilians against ethnic Germans, which in turn fueled further violence. A Polish investigation in 2004 estimated that approximately 40–50 Poles and between 100 and 300 Germans were killed during these initial clashes.

The Propaganda Label

The term "Bloody Sunday" was strategically coined and disseminated by Nazi propaganda officials. Their objective was to sensationalize and exaggerate German casualties, thereby justifying the invasion and subsequent atrocities. An explicit instruction to the press mandated that the phrase "Bloody Sunday" become a permanent fixture in public discourse, continuously underlined to circulate globally as a narrative of Polish barbarism against Germans.

Historical Context

Bydgoszcz Through History

Bydgoszcz's historical trajectory significantly shaped its demographic and political landscape leading up to 1939. Originally part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was annexed by the Kingdom of Prussia in 1772 during the First Partition of Poland. Following Germany's unification in 1871, it became part of the German Empire until the end of World War I. The Treaty of Versailles in February 1920 returned Bydgoszcz and its surrounding region to the Second Polish Republic, leading to a notable emigration of ethnic Germans from the area during the interwar period.

Nazi Ambitions and Ethnic Tensions

The ascent of the Nazi Party in Germany, under Adolf Hitler, profoundly impacted Bydgoszcz. Hitler's revitalization of the Völkisch movement aimed to appeal to German minorities outside Germany's post-WWI borders, recruiting them for Nazi intelligence operations. His explicit goal was the creation of a Greater German State through the annexation of territories with German populations. By March 1939, escalating demands for the Polish Corridor, coupled with mutual accusations of atrocities and rising nationalist fervor, led to a complete breakdown in Polish-German relations. German media and politicians, including Hitler, waged an extensive propaganda campaign, falsely accusing Polish authorities of orchestrating or condoning violent ethnic cleansing against Germans in Poland.

Pre-Invasion Hostilities

With the outbreak of armed conflict on September 1, 1939, ethnic Germans in various parts of Poland faced attacks, and the Polish government arrested 10,000 to 15,000 individuals suspected of German loyalty, marching them eastward. Approximately 2,000 ethnic Germans died in these actions. Nazi propagandists seized upon these incidents, particularly the events in Bydgoszcz, to legitimize the invasion and portray it as a defensive measure against Polish aggression.

The Incident Unfolds

Fifth Column Attacks

The violence in Bydgoszcz was ignited by fifth column attacks perpetrated by ethnic German partisans against the Polish garrison. German documents, recently unearthed by historian Jochen Böhler, confirm that these attacks were orchestrated by agents of the Nazi intelligence organization Abwehr, recruited from within the city's German minority. As the Wehrmacht's Fourth Army advanced on September 3, the conflict intensified, leading to the deaths of up to 300 ethnic Germans and 40 to 50 Poles. While some German casualties may have resulted from an anti-German pogrom, the primary catalyst was the organized sabotage.

Documents from Abwehr archives, including reports by General Erwin von Lahousen, detail extensive sabotage operations and paramilitary activities in Bydgoszcz:

  • Sabotage Group 12: Tasked with disabling a local power-plant and cutting phone communications between Inowrocław and Toruń.
  • Targets for Destruction: Plans included blowing up the main office of the German organization Deutsche Vereinigung, the passport office Deutsche Passstelle, the German private school, and setting fire to the German theater and offices of the Jungdeutsche Partei. These operations were coordinated by the Schutzstaffel (SS).
  • Paramilitary Formations: German records stored in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg indicate a "Kampf-Organisation" of 150 members under local German leadership (Kleiss), part of a larger 2,077-member military formation coordinated from Poznan. Additionally, a 10-member combat unit under Otto Meister operated under orders from the Abwehr's Wrocław office.

Polish police conducted arrests prior to the invasion, uncovering explosives, armbands, and guns, indicating awareness of these clandestine activities.

Chaos and Civilian Panic

During the night of September 2-3, German saboteurs, disguised in Polish uniforms, deliberately spread panic among Bydgoszcz inhabitants, urging them to flee due to Poland's supposed defeat. This created a chaotic civilian exodus that severely disrupted Polish military movements. Simultaneously, some Germans with good relations with their Polish neighbors issued cryptic warnings to hide by 10 AM on September 3, hinting at impending danger without revealing specifics.

Polish Response and Casualties

As Polish Army units (9th, 15th, and 27th Infantry Divisions of Army Pomorze) withdrew through Bydgoszcz, they came under fire from German irregulars within the city. A British witness reported a Polish artillery unit being shot at from a house, and subsequently from a Jesuit church. In the ensuing firefight, both sides sustained casualties. Captured German non-uniformed armed insurgents were summarily executed, and instances of mob lynching were also reported. The 2004 Polish investigation confirmed that Polish troops were indeed targeted by German minority members and Abwehr agents, leading to the aforementioned casualties.

Furthermore, German forces entering the city faced resistance from the paramilitary Citizen Watch (Straż Obywatelska), particularly in the working-class Szwederowo neighborhood. Despite assurances from General Eccard von Gablenz that they would be treated as POWs under international law, the Citizen Watch members who surrendered were later handed over by the Wehrmacht to members of Einsatzgruppe IV. Approximately 40 prisoners suffered fatal beatings with metal rods by SS men. The remaining POWs, which included the leaders of the Citizen Watch, Konrad Fiedler and Marian Maczuga, were executed by gunfire in the Bielawki neighborhood of Bydgoszcz.

Nazi Propaganda

Orchestrated Exploitation

Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry extensively exploited the events in Bydgoszcz to garner support for the invasion within Germany. British historian Ian Kershaw highlights how attacks on ethnic Germans were cynically manipulated to justify a policy of "ethnic cleansing" that far exceeded any notion of retaliation. Initially, German propaganda claimed 5,400 deaths in the "September Murders," including "Bromberg Bloody Sunday." By February 1940, this figure was inflated tenfold to 58,000 German dead, reportedly on Hitler's direct instructions. More reliable estimates place the total number of ethnic Germans killed in various incidents, forced marches, bombing, and shelling at approximately 4,000. These atrocities, while terrible, were largely spontaneous outbursts of hatred driven by panic and fear, and did not remotely justify the calculated savagery of German treatment aimed at subjugating the Polish people.

Impunity for German Crimes

A secret decree issued by Hitler on October 4, 1939, explicitly stated that all crimes committed by Germans between September 1 and October 4, 1939, were not to be prosecuted. This provided a blanket amnesty for actions taken during the invasion, further enabling the atrocities. The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau's investigation in 1939–1940, which included interrogations of Polish soldiers, ethnic Germans, and Polish civilians, concluded that the events were a result of panic and confusion among Polish troops. The investigation also involved exhumations and forensic assessments to determine causes of death and potential military involvement.

German Reprisals

Mass Executions and Brutality

The events of Bloody Sunday were swiftly followed by severe German reprisals and mass executions of Polish civilians. Military units including the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen SS, and Wehrmacht carried out these retaliatory killings. German historian Christian Raitz von Frentz documented that 876 Poles were tried by German tribunals for involvement in Bloody Sunday by the end of 1939, with 87 men and 13 women sentenced without appeal. Polish historian Czesław Madajczyk noted 120 executions directly related to Bloody Sunday, plus an additional 20 hostages executed after a German soldier was allegedly attacked by a Polish sniper.

  • Citizen Watch Betrayal: Members of the Citizen Watch who surrendered under promises of POW treatment were instead handed over to Einsatzgruppe IV. Approximately 40 prisoners suffered fatal beatings with metal rods by SS men. The remaining POWs, including leaders Konrad Fiedler and Marian Maczuga, were executed by gunfire in the Bielawki neighborhood.
  • Boryszew Massacre: Fifty Polish prisoners of war from Bydgoszcz were accused by Nazi summary courts of participating in "Bloody Sunday" and subsequently shot in the Boryszew massacre.
  • Hostage Executions: General Walter Braemer, the German governor, ordered the execution of 80 Polish hostages over several days, citing alleged Polish sniper attacks on German troops (unconfirmed by Polish sources). By September 8, between 200 and 400 Polish civilians had been killed.
  • Targeted Killings: Richard Rhodes recounted Boy Scouts being shot against a wall in the marketplace, and a devoted priest who rushed to administer the last sacrament also being killed, receiving five wounds. Murders continued throughout the week; 34 of the leading tradespeople and merchants of the town were shot, as well as many other leading citizens.

Many Poles, particularly members of the intelligentsia and the Jewish community, were specifically targeted for deportation or outright murder.

The Valley of Death and Operation Tannenberg

By December 1939, Germans had killed 5,000 Polish civilians from Bydgoszcz County, with about a third from Bydgoszcz itself. These victims included the mayor, Leon Barciszewski. Many of these killings occurred in a section of the city that became infamously known as the "Valley of Death." These localized atrocities were part of the broader "Operation Tannenberg," a large-scale anti-Polish extermination campaign. Ultimately, over 20,000 Polish citizens of Bydgoszcz, representing 14% of the population, were either shot or died in concentration camps during the German occupation.

Scholarly Debate

Disputed Casualty Figures

The precise number of victims of Bloody Sunday remains a subject of historical contention. German journalist Peter Aurich (pseudonym Peter Nasarski) estimated German civilian deaths in Bydgoszcz at 366, while Hugo Rasmus suggested at least 415. In contrast, Polish historians Włodzimierz Jastrzębski and Czesław Madajczyk estimated ethnic German deaths at 103 and approximately 300 (150 on September 3, the rest in subsequent days), respectively. Polish scholars argue that many civilian losses occurred during actual combat or from German air force (Luftwaffe) strafing, which German witnesses also confirmed. Nazi propaganda, by portraying the German minority as hostile and aiding the invasion, contributed to Polish misconceptions and reactions.

The Fifth Column Controversy

A central debate revolves around the existence and role of a German fifth column. Polish historiography traditionally asserted that German minority members or infiltrators opened fire on Polish troops, triggering the violence. Conversely, some German historians argued that Polish troops or panicking civilians overreacted, targeting innocent Germans. This debate has largely been resolved by investigations of German archives, which confirmed the existence of several diversion and saboteur groups in Bydgoszcz, overseen by Nazi intelligence. For instance, Otto Niefeldt, an Abwehr agent from Szczecin, was identified among the Germans killed. While early German accounts, like Nasarski's, are often rejected in Poland due to their reliance on Nazi-collected witness statements, modern research has provided clearer insights.

  • Von Frentz's Interpretation: Christian Raitz von Frentz suggested the event was likely caused by confusion among retreating Polish soldiers, a breakdown in public order, and panic among the Polish majority following German air raids and the discovery of a German Army reconnaissance group. He acknowledged the unreliability of eyewitness accounts from both sides regarding atrocities.
  • Polish Historians' Stance: Scholars like Madajczyk, Jastrzębski (though he later modified his views), Karol Marian Pospieszalski, and Ryszard Wojan maintained that the killings were initiated by ethnic Germans, disguised as civilians, firing upon Polish troops. They argued that these actions, alongside events like the Gleiwitz incident, were part of the larger Nazi "Operation Himmler," a false flag operation designed to create an illusion of Polish aggression and discredit Poles. Pospieszalski and Wojan even posited that German fifth column agents might have deliberately aimed to provoke German civilian casualties to fuel Nazi propaganda, an argument questioned by Harry Gordon due to the implied sacrifice of their own citizens.
  • Modern Consensus: The contemporary consensus among Polish historians, supported by Tomasz Chinciński's 2004 research for the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), confirms that the events constituted an attack on the Polish population and military by German militia. Chinciński's work, based on newly discovered Abwehr documents, details plans for diversionary activities and paramilitary groups in Bydgoszcz, while also acknowledging instances of Polish mob lynching of ethnic Germans, which were minimized in Polish communist-era historiography.

A 2006 panel discussion at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw, involving Chinciński and German historian Hans-Erich Volkmann, further highlighted the biases in early post-war German historiography and the political instrumentalization of the Bydgoszcz events. By 2007, documents emerged showing General Erwin Lahousen praising German saboteur actions in Bydgoszcz and organizing support for them, solidifying the understanding of organized German involvement.

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References

References

  1.  "Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczpospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy" Tomasz Chińciński, page 181 Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 4/2 (8), 159-195. 2005
  2.  "Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczpospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy" Tomasz Chińciński, page 180 Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 4/2 (8), 159-195. 2005
  3.  Der "Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz" in Polen 1939/1940 Christian Jansen, Arno Weckbecker page 26-27, page 2010
  4.  Raitz von Frentz, page 254
  5.  Włodzimierz Jastrzębski, Relacje bydgoskich Niemców o wydarzeniach z września 1939 roku zebrane w latach 1958–1961 i wcześniej w Republice Federalnej Niemiec
  6.  Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczpospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy" Tomasz Chińciński, Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 4/2 (8), 159-195. 2005
  7.  [2] Historycy wytropili dywersantów Jacek Gałęzewski 03 September 2007 Gazeta Wyborcza
A full list of references for this article are available at the Bloody Sunday (1939) Wikipedia page

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