The Formosa Resolution

🗺️ Shifting Sovereignty

Formosa and its adjacent islands were under Qing dynasty rule until 1895, when their sovereignty was ceded to Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War.^[3] Decades later, during World War II, the 1943 Cairo Declaration stipulated that jurisdiction over these islands would revert to China upon Japan's surrender. Post-war, the United States, as an ally of China, formally recognized China's right to reclaim territories, including Formosa, that had been taken by Japan.

⚔️ Escalating Tensions

The early 1950s witnessed a significant deterioration in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. This period was marked by several critical events:

• The PRC's seizure of U.S. consular property in Beijing.
• The signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
• A notable buildup of PRC forces in Chekiang and Fukien, provinces directly opposite Formosa.^[5]

These developments, coupled with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, compelled President Eisenhower to deploy the American navy to the Taiwan Strait, aiming to deter a potential PRC attack on Formosa.^[5]

diplomacy Diplomatic Shifts

For Western powers, the Republic of China (ROC) had long been considered the sole legitimate government of China, maintaining its seat at the United Nations since the organization's inception. However, the CCP's victory in the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent establishment of the PRC ignited a contentious debate over China's rightful representation at the UN. The U.S. actively opposed a UN seat for the PRC, further exacerbating bilateral tensions.^[3]

By the mid-1950s, the U.S. implemented a comprehensive policy of trade embargoes, isolation, and containment against the PRC.^[3] Concurrently, the Eisenhower administration significantly increased its diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to Taiwan, providing US$527 million in economic aid and US$940 million in military aid between 1952 and 1954.^[3]

🏛️ Congressional Action

On January 6, 1955, President Eisenhower formally submitted the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC to the Senate for its advice and consent. This treaty specifically addressed armed attacks in the West Pacific area directed against Formosa and the Pescadores territories.^[7]

The situation intensified in mid-January 1955 when CCP forces seized Inchaing Island, located 210 miles north of Taiwan. Continued attacks on Quemoy and Matsu extended armed skirmishes to mainland Chinese ports, prompting Eisenhower to request congressional permission for military force to defend Taiwan on January 24.^[8]

✅ Legislative Approval

Rapidly, on January 25, 1955, the House of Representatives approved the resolution authorizing the President to defend Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands by an overwhelming vote of 410–3.^[9] The Senate followed suit on January 28, approving the resolution with a vote of 85–3.^[10][11]

Despite the Formosa problem finally gaining the attention of the U.N. Security Council on the same day the U.S. Senate approved the resolution, the issue was effectively dropped from the UN agenda due to the PRC's refusal to participate in discussions. With congressional approval secured, President Eisenhower signed the Formosa Resolution into law on January 29, 1955.

⚖️ Strategic Ambiguity

The Formosa Resolution was officially adopted as a mechanism to prevent a recurrence of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. It empowered President Eisenhower to fully defend Formosa by granting him the authority to employ U.S. armed forces in the Taiwan Strait. However, it is crucial to note that while the Resolution authorized the use of force, it did not explicitly articulate overt support for the ROC's government. This nuanced approach aimed to prevent further military conflict between the PRC and the ROC without explicitly aligning the U.S. with Formosa's political aspirations.^[8]

🇨🇳 The 1970s: Rapprochement

More than a decade after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the U.S. fundamentally shifted its diplomatic strategy. As a condition for resuming diplomatic relations with the PRC, the U.S. terminated its formal diplomatic ties with the ROC.^[12] President Richard Nixon, recognizing the strategic advantage of the Sino-Soviet split, pursued a policy of rapprochement with China, beginning with his historic 1972 visit.^[13][14] This culminated in 1979 with the signing of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations by President Carter and Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping.^[13] In this communiqué, the U.S. recognized the legitimacy of the PRC but only acknowledged its claims over Taiwan.

In April of the same year, Congress re-established unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, which permitted continued commercial and cultural exchanges and arms sales between the U.S. and Taiwan. This act allowed the U.S. to maintain ties with Taiwan while upholding its recognition of the PRC as China's legitimate representative.^[15]

🇺🇸 The 1980s: Assurances & Trade

During the 1980s, the Reagan administration issued the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. These pledges affirmed the U.S. commitment to honor the Taiwan Relations Act, to refrain from intervening in disputes between Taiwan and China, and to continue arms sales to Taiwan.

However, by August 1982, the Reagan administration signed the third joint communiqué agreement with the PRC, which effectively normalized U.S.-China relations and reiterated the U.S.' adherence to the One China policy. Despite President Reagan's personal inclination for stronger ties with Taiwan, Cold War fears of Soviet expansion pressured his administration to strengthen relations with China. Consequently, by June 1984, the Reagan administration authorized the sale of U.S. military equipment to Beijing.^[16]

🗳️ The 1990s: Democratic Assertion

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 saw China conduct missile tests in the waters near Taiwan. These tests were a clear attempt to influence Taiwanese voters against pro-independence candidates, such as incumbent Kuomintang president Lee Teng-hui and the Democratic Progressive Party's Peng Ming-min, in Taiwan's first free presidential election.^[17][18][19] Despite these coercive tactics, Lee Teng-hui secured a significant victory in March 1996, demonstrating the resilience of Taiwan's nascent democracy.^[20]

🌐 The 21st Century: Evolving Dynamics

For decades into the 21st century, the U.S. maintained its recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate China. However, a notable deviation occurred in 2016 when Donald J. Trump, after winning the U.S. presidential election, spoke with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen via telephone. This call broke established U.S. diplomatic protocol towards China and raised questions regarding the U.S.' commitment to its One-China policy.

President Trump subsequently sought to alleviate these concerns during a call on February 9, 2017, with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping, reaffirming his commitment to the One China policy. Despite this, the U.S. continues to maintain robust unofficial ties with Taiwan, including the provision of defense aid, reflecting the enduring complexity and strategic importance of the relationship.^[21]

📜 References