Echoes of the Steppe: Unveiling the Mongolian Revolution of 1921
A scholarly examination of the pivotal events that reshaped Mongolia's destiny, from autonomy to the People's Republic.
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Revolution Overview
A Defining Transformation
The Mongolian Revolution of 1921 represents a critical military and political juncture in Mongolian history. It was a concerted effort by Mongolian revolutionaries, significantly bolstered by the Soviet Red Army, to expel Russian White Guards from the nation. This successful campaign culminated in the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924, marking a profound shift in the country's political landscape. While achieving nominal independence, the newly formed republic operated as a satellite state of the Soviet Union until the democratic revolution of January 1990. Furthermore, this revolution decisively ended the Chinese Beiyang government's occupation of Mongolia, which had commenced in 1919.
Key Chronology and Setting
This transformative period unfolded over several months, specifically from March 1 to July 11, 1921, spanning approximately four months, one week, and three days. The entirety of these events took place within the geographical confines of Mongolia, making it a deeply internal yet internationally influenced conflict. The outcome was a decisive victory for the Mongolian People's Party, leading to the collapse of the Bogd Khanate, the cessation of Chinese control, the birth of the Mongolian People's Republic, and the commencement of Soviet influence over Mongolia.
Principal Combatants
The revolution involved a complex interplay of forces, each with distinct objectives. On one side, the Mongolian People's Party, supported by the Russian Red Army, sought to establish a new order. Opposing them were the existing Bogd Khanate of Mongolia, backed by Russian White Guards, and the forces of China's Beiyang government, which included the Anhui clique and received support from Japan. The conflict resulted in an estimated 1,000 casualties, including those sustained during the preceding Chinese occupation of Mongolia.
Historical Prelude
The 1911 Revolution and Qing Policies
For approximately three centuries, the Qing dynasty maintained a policy of segregating non-Han peoples on its frontier from the Han population, albeit with varying degrees of success. By the late 19th century, as China faced the threat of partition by Western powers and Japan, the Russian Empire emerged as the primary concern for Qing territorial integrity. In response, the Qing government initiated the "New Administration" or "New Policies" (Xin zheng). These policies aimed at the sinification of Mongolia through Han colonization, the exploitation of natural resources (mining, timber, fishing), military training, and educational reforms. Many Mongols perceived these policies as a direct threat to their traditional way of life, which had been guaranteed under Qing authority, prompting them to seek independence. In July 1911, Khalkha nobles successfully persuaded the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the spiritual head of Mongolian Buddhism, to declare independence from the Qing dynasty, leading to a delegation seeking Russian assistance.
The Bogd Khanate Era
Following the Xinhai Revolution in China, Outer Mongolia declared its independence on December 1, 1911, establishing a theocracy under the Khutuktu, who was installed as the Bogd Khan (Great Khan or Emperor) on December 29. This marked the beginning of the Bogd Khan era (1911-1919). The new Mongolian government was a unique synthesis of Buddhist theocracy, traditional Qing imperial customs, and nascent 20th-century Western political structures. The Bogd Khan wielded powers akin to former Qing emperors, receiving tribute from the nobility and conferring official ranks. The state also endeavored to modernize, forming a national parliament with two chambers, a five-ministry government, and a national army. However, significant power remained concentrated in the Bogd Khan's court, with the Buddhist religious establishment expanding its financial influence. Diplomatic efforts between 1912 and 1915 focused on achieving international recognition for a pan-Mongolian state encompassing Inner Mongolia, Western Mongolia, Upper Mongolia, Barga, and Tannu Uriankhai. This aspiration was ultimately curtailed by the tripartite Treaty of Kyakhta (1915), which granted Mongolia autonomy within the Chinese state but prohibited China from deploying troops, a compromise that left both Chinese and Mongols dissatisfied for differing reasons.
Autonomy Abolished
Shifting Sands: Russian Revolution's Impact
The geopolitical landscape dramatically shifted with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War a year later, fundamentally altering the dynamic between Mongolia and China. Amidst rumors of an impending Bolshevik invasion, the Mongolians, albeit with considerable reluctance and under Chinese High Commissioner Chen Yi's persuasion in Urga (modern Ulaanbaatar), requested military assistance from China in the summer of 1918. Approximately 200 to 250 Chinese troops arrived in September. When the anticipated invasion did not materialize, the Bogd Khan's government sought the withdrawal of these troops. However, the Beijing government, viewing this as a breach of the Kyakhta Treaty, refused, interpreting it as an initial step toward reasserting Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia.
The "Sixty-four Points" and Bogd Khan's Resistance
In early 1919, Grigori Semyonov, a White Guard general, began assembling Buryats and Inner Mongols in Siberia with the aim of forming a pan-Mongolian state, inviting the Khalkhas to join. Their refusal was met with threats of invasion, which prompted the lay princes to envision an end to theocratic rule. By August, the Mongolian Foreign Minister approached Chen Yi, conveying a request for military aid against Semyonov from the "representatives of the four aimags" (Khalkhas). Crucially, this message also declared the Khalkhas' unanimous desire to abolish autonomy and revert to the former Qing system. Negotiations, involving representatives from the Bogd Khan's court, swiftly commenced. By October, Chen Yi and the Mongolian princes had agreed upon the "Sixty-four Points," a framework designed to effectively re-establish the previous political and administrative system. While the upper house of the Mongolian Parliament consented, the lower house did not. Despite the dissent, the upper house's decision prevailed, and Chen Yi forwarded the draft articles to Beijing. The Bogd Khan, however, dispatched a delegation of lamas to Beijing, asserting that the Mongolian people did not wish to abolish autonomy and requested Chen Yi's recall. Nevertheless, the Chinese government, prioritizing the reassertion of sovereignty, approved the "Points" on October 28.
Xu Shuzheng's Assertions and Formal Abolition
Concurrent political developments in China profoundly impacted Mongolian history. The Beijing government, under the control of the "Anhui clique" led by Duan Qirui, faced severe public criticism following its failure at the Paris Peace Conference regarding the Shandong Problem. To deflect this criticism, Duan rebranded his office as the "Bureau of Frontier Defense" and his army as the "Frontier Defense Army." In June 1919, Xu Shuzheng, a prominent figure in Duan's clique, was appointed "Northwest Frontier Commissioner," granting him supreme Chinese military and civilian authority over Outer Mongolia. Earlier, in April, Xu had presented a comprehensive plan to Beijing for the total social and economic reconstruction of Mongolia, advocating for Chinese colonization and intermarriage to "transform the customs of the Mongols," effectively aiming for complete sinification under his rule. Xu's arrival in Urga in October, accompanied by a military contingent, signaled his intent. He informed Chen Yi that the "Sixty-four Points" would be renegotiated based on his "Eight Articles," which emphasized population increase and economic development. Xu threatened the Bogd Khan with deportation if he refused to ratify these articles. Although the Bogd Khan submitted them to the Mongolian Parliament, where the upper house accepted and the lower house resisted (with lamas being particularly vocal), the upper house's decision again held sway. On November 17, 1919, Xu formally accepted a petition for the abolition of autonomy, notably signed by the ministers and deputy ministers but conspicuously not by the Bogd Khan himself. A ceremonial transfer of authority in December, featuring Chinese symbols and required prostrations from Mongols, was met with quiet defiance as some Mongolian herdsmen and lamas tore down Chinese Republic flags from the palace gate that night.
Seeds of Resistance
Emergence of Revolutionary Groups
Between 1919 and early 1920, a nascent resistance movement began to coalesce among a few Mongolians, forming two distinct groups: the "Consular Hill" (Konsulyn denj) and "East Urga" (Züün khüree) factions. These groups represented the initial organized opposition to Xu Shuzheng's policies and the abolition of Mongolian autonomy. The Consular Hill group was primarily led by Dogsomyn Bodoo (1885–1922), a highly educated 35-year-old lama who had served in the Russian Consulate in Urga during the Bogd Khan era. Sharing a yurt with Bodoo was Khorloogiin Choibalsan (1895–1953), who would later become a dominant figure in Mongolian politics. Their discussions, often influenced by Mikhail Kucherenko, a Bolshevik sympathizer, revolved around the Russian Revolution and Mongolia's political predicament. The East Urga group's leadership included Soliin Danzan (1885–1924), an official in the Ministry of Finance, and Dansranbilegiin Dogsom (1884–1939) from the Ministry of the Army. Damdin Sükhbaatar (1893–1923), later revered as the "Lenin of Mongolia," was also a member, though less prominent at this initial stage. The East Urga group's origins trace back to mid-November 1919, when militant members of the dissolved Mongolian Parliament secretly resolved to resist Chinese rule. They twice sought the Bogd Khan's support for armed resistance, but he advised patience. Early plots to seize the Mongolian army's arsenal and assassinate Xu Shuzheng were thwarted by Chinese security measures.
Forging the Mongolian People's Party
The Russian expatriate community in Urga, which had established a revolutionary "Municipal Duma" with Bolshevik sympathies, became aware of the Consular Hill group. In March 1920, I. Sorokovikov, a member of the Duma, traveled to Irkutsk, carrying a report on these Mongolian revolutionaries. Upon his return to Urga in June, Sorokovikov met with representatives from both Mongolian groups, promising "assistance of all kinds" from the Soviet government to the Mongolian "workers" and inviting them to send delegates to Russia for further discussions. This Soviet overture provided a new impetus for the previously disparate groups. Overcoming their cautious distance and differing agendas—the Consular Hill group leaning towards a progressive social program, while the East Urga group was more nationalistic—they convened on June 25. This meeting led to the formal establishment of the "Mongolian People's Party" (later renamed the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party), the adoption of a "Party Oath," and the decision to send Danzan and Choibalsan as delegates to Russia.
Appeals for Soviet Intervention
Danzan and Choibalsan arrived in Verkhneudinsk, the capital of the pro-Soviet Far Eastern Republic, in early July. Their initial meetings with Boris Shumyatsky, the acting head of government, were unproductive, as he evaded their demands for swift Soviet military assistance against the Chinese for three weeks. Eventually, they were advised to obtain a formal letter, bearing the Bogd Khan's seal, explicitly requesting Soviet aid. Despite difficulties, the MPP successfully secured such a letter from the Khan's court. Five additional Party members—D. Losol, Dambyn Chagdarjav, Dogsom, L. Dendev, and Sükhbaatar—then transported this crucial document to Verkhneudinsk. However, Shumyatsky informed the now seven delegates that he lacked the authority to approve their request, directing them to Irkutsk. Upon reaching Irkutsk in August, the Mongolians met with the head of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. They presented their needs: military instructors, 10,000 rifles, cannon, machine guns, and financial support. They were instructed to draft a new appeal, this time in the Party's name rather than the Bogd Khan's, outlining their objectives and requests, which would then be considered by the Siberian Revolutionary Committee in Omsk. Before separating, the group formulated a more revolutionary appeal, advocating for the divestment of hereditary power from the Mongolian nobility, to be replaced by a democratic government with the Bogd Khan as a limited monarch, alongside an urgent plea for military assistance.
Ungern-Sternberg's Intervention
The White Guard Offensive
After numerous meetings with Soviet authorities in Omsk, the Mongolian delegation was informed that such a significant matter could only be decided in Moscow. Danzan and his compatriots proceeded to Moscow, arriving in mid-September, where they engaged in frequent but inconclusive discussions with Soviet and Comintern officials for over a month. However, a dramatic turn of events—a White Guard invasion of Mongolia led by Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg—compelled the Soviet government to act. In late October to early November 1920, Ungern-Sternberg's force of approximately 1,000 troops laid siege to the Chinese garrison in Urga, which numbered around 7,000. On November 10 or 11, the three Mongolian delegates were urgently summoned and informed that the Party would receive all necessary weapons, but they must swiftly return to Mongolia to expand the Party's membership and raise an army. Concurrently, Moscow issued orders for the Soviet Fifth Red Army to cross the Mongolian border and neutralize von Ungern-Sternberg's forces.
Urga's Fall and Bogd Khan's Restoration
Despite the initial Soviet directive, the Chinese garrison in Urga successfully repelled von Ungern-Sternberg's first assault. This unexpected resistance led to a shift in Soviet strategy. The Far Eastern Republic's army was already depleted, and the Fifth Army, the only remaining Red Army force on the eastern front, had seen many of its experienced units demobilized, redeployed to Poland, or assigned to critical labor tasks for Siberian economic recovery by late 1920. Consequently, following the Chinese repulsion of Ungern-Sternberg, the Soviets rescinded their invasion order on November 28. However, von Ungern-Sternberg launched a second, more successful attack in early February 1921. This time, the Chinese soldiers and civilians fled Urga in disarray. With the city's fall, Chinese administrations and military garrisons in Uliastai and Khovd rapidly withdrew to Xinjiang. The Bogd Khan was subsequently restored as the Mongolian monarch by von Ungern-Sternberg, and his government was reinstated in a solemn ceremony held on February 22.
MPP's Ascendancy
Soviet Support and Party Consolidation
The news of von Ungern-Sternberg's capture of Urga once again reshaped Soviet strategic considerations. On February 10, a plenary session of the Comintern in Irkutsk formally resolved to support the "struggle of the Mongolian people for liberation and independence" with financial aid, weaponry, and military instructors. With this renewed Soviet backing, the MPP emerged as a formidable contender for power. The Party, previously somewhat loosely structured, now required enhanced organizational and ideological clarity. A clandestine party conference, later recognized as the first congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, convened from March 1–3 in Kyakhta. Attended by 17 individuals in its first session and 26 in its second, the conference approved the formation of an army command staff under Sükhbaatar, advised by two Russians. It also elected a central committee chaired by Danzan, with a Comintern representative, and adopted a party manifesto drafted by the progressive Buryat Jamsrangiin Tseveen.
Provisional Government and Propaganda War
On March 13, a provisional government comprising seven men was established, soon to be led by Bodoo. A significant military achievement followed on March 18, when the Mongolian guerrilla army, having expanded its ranks to 400 through recruitment and conscription, successfully seized the Chinese garrison at Kyakhta Maimaicheng (the Chinese sector of Kyakhta). This victory instilled a new sense of confidence within the Party, which promptly issued a proclamation announcing the formation of its government, the expulsion of the Chinese, and a pledge to convene a congress of "representatives of the masses" to elect a permanent government. This period saw a propaganda contest between the provisional government and the Bogd Khan's court. The Party disseminated leaflets across the northern border, urging the populace to arm themselves against the White Guards, while the Bogd Khan's legal government countered with warnings that these revolutionaries intended to dismantle the Mongolian state and undermine the foundations of the Buddhist faith.
Soviet Intervention and Urga's Liberation
The new Soviet government, keen on establishing diplomatic relations with China, had initially hesitated to openly support the Mongolians, fearing it would jeopardize ongoing negotiations. However, by early 1921, these constraints diminished: China suspended talks with the Soviet government in January 1921, appeared unable to manage von Ungern-Sternberg's forces, and in early March, rejected Soviet military assistance against the White Guards. These developments solidified Russia's commitment to the Mongolian revolution. This commitment materialized in a significant increase in Soviet advisors and weaponry to the MPP throughout March. In March and April, Soviet and Far Eastern Republican units were transferred to Kyakhta, while the Mongolian guerrillas doubled their numbers to 800. Von Ungern-Sternberg's forces launched an attack on Kyakhta in early June but were decisively repelled by a Red Army contingent several times larger than his own, incurring heavy losses. On June 28, the main Soviet expeditionary corps crossed into Mongolia, and by July 6, the first Mongolian and Russian units triumphantly entered Urga. The Mongolian revolutionaries immediately began to assert their authority. On July 9, they informed the Bogd Khan's court that power now resided with the people, declaring that "The disorder which reigns presently is as much due to the shortcomings of the [hereditary] leaders as to the fact that the existing laws and situation do not correspond any longer to the spirit of the times. Everything, therefore, except religion, will be subject to gradual change." The following day, the Party's Central Committee issued a resolution establishing a new government led by Bodoo, with the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu serving as a limited monarch. On July 11, he was ceremonially installed on the throne of Mongolia.
Revolution's Aftermath
Defeat of the White Guards and New Governance
With his forces defeated, von Ungern-Sternberg's army disintegrated, and he was subsequently captured by a Red Army detachment and executed later that year. The conflict then shifted to western Mongolia, where the remaining White Guards were either destroyed or expelled by the end of 1921. In Urga, the Mongolian revolutionaries swiftly implemented their vision. On July 9, they formally communicated to the Bogd Khan's court that power had transitioned to the people, signaling a fundamental restructuring of governance. The Party's Central Committee, on July 10, issued a resolution establishing a new government under Bodoo, with the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu retaining a ceremonial role as a limited monarch. This new political arrangement was ceremonially inaugurated on July 11, marking the formal beginning of the revolutionary government's authority.
International Recognition and the MPR
The Chinese government, initially not indifferent to von Ungern-Sternberg's invasion, had appointed Zhang Zuolin to command an expeditionary army. However, the Red Army's occupation of Urga in July and internal Chinese warlord politics compelled Zhang to abandon his plans. Concurrently, Chinese forces engaged and largely annihilated a 350-strong White Russian contingent under Colonel Kazagrandi in the Gobi desert in June 1921, with only small groups surrendering. Other White Russian and Buryat remnants of Ungern-Sternberg's army were massacred by Soviet Red Army and Mongol forces that same summer, including a brutal clubbing to death of Colonel Vangdabov's Buryats in Uliastai for their loyalty to Ungern-Sternberg. Diplomatically, the Soviets proposed a tripartite conference with China, similar to the 1914–15 Kyakhta Treaty discussions, to address Mongolia's relationship with China. Beijing, emboldened by the prospect of Zhang's expedition, rejected this, asserting Mongolia as an integral part of China and thus not subject to international negotiation. It was not until 1924 that a Chinese-Soviet treaty was concluded, wherein the Soviet Union recognized Mongolia as an integral part of China and agreed to withdraw its troops. Notwithstanding this treaty, the death of the Khutuktu in 1924 provided the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) with the opportunity to entirely dismantle theocratic rule and declare the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). In 1946, the Chinese Nationalist government recognized the full sovereignty of the MPR, though this recognition was later revoked by the Kuomintang-led Republic of China after its retreat to Taiwan. However, the Republic of China (Taiwan) officially reiterated its recognition of Mongolia's independence in 2002. Further solidifying this stance, on May 21, 2012, the Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China explicitly stated that Mongolia (referred to as Outer Mongolia in Taiwan) should be considered an independent country, denying its inclusion in constitutional territorial claims. This shift was underscored by the ROC government in Taiwan ceasing to appoint ministers of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 2017.
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References
References
- Also known as the Outer Mongolian Revolution of 1921. Officially known as the People's Revolution of 1921 or simply People's Revolution.
- Spence, The Search for Modern China, p. 329
- Thomas E. Ewing, Ch'ing Policies in Outer Mongolia 1900â1911, Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge, Eng., 1980), pp. 145â157.
- See Thomas E. Ewing, "Revolution on the Chinese Frontier: Outer Mongolia in 1911", Journal of Asian History (Bloomington, Indiana, 1978), pp. 101â19.
- Thomas E. Ewing, Between the Hammer and the Anvil. Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1911â1921, (Bloomington, Indiana, 1980), pp. 34â43.
- Ts. Puntsagnorov, Mongolyn avtonomit üyeiin tüükh [The history of Mongolian in the autonomous period], (Ulaanbaatar, 1955), p. 195.
- Zhung-O guanxi shiliao: Wai Menggu [Sources on Chinese-Russian relations: Outer Mongolia], (Taipei, 1959), no. 386, pp. 573â574.
- Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao chidu kao [Study of the Outer Mongolian political system], (Taipei, 1962), p. 237.
- L Dendev, Mongolyn tovch tüükh [A short history of Mongolia], (Ulaanbaatar, 1934), pp. 175â176.
- Chen Chungzu, Wai menggu jinshi shi [A modern history of Mongolia], (Shanghai, 1926), bien 3, p. 11.
- A. Kallinikov, U istokov mongol'skoi revolyutsii [Sources of the Mongolian revolution], Khozyaistvo Mongolii, pt. 1, p. 74.
- Thomas E. Ewing chronicled the history of these two groups in "The Origin of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: 1920", Mongolian Studies (Bloomington, Ind., 1978â79), pp. 79â105.
- L. Bat-Ochir, D. Dashjamts, Damdiny Sukhe-Bator. Biografiya [Biography of Damdiny Sükhbaatar], (Moscow, 1971), p. 36.
- Choibalsan, Losol & Demid 1934, pp. 100â102.
- Choibalsan, Losol & Demid 1934, pp. 172â173.
- Choibalsan, Losol & Demid 1934, pp. 174â195.
- Choibalsan, Losol & Demid 1934, pp. 187â193.
- Choibalsan, Losol & Demid 1934, pp. 242â248.
- Sovetsko-mongolskiye otnosheniya, 1921â1974. [Soviet-Mongolian relations, 1921â1974.], (Moscow, 1975), v. 1, p. 464.
- See Jan M. Meijer, ed. The Trotsky Papers 1917â1922 (The Hague, 1971), v. 2, no. 669, pp. 401â403.
- Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR [Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR], (Moscow, 1957), v. 3, no. 192, pp. 55â56.
- Istoricheskskii opyt bratskogo sodruzhestva KPSS i MNRP v bor'be za sotsializm [The historical experience of the solidarity of the CPSS and the MPRP in the struggle for socialism], (Moscow, 1971), p. 217.
- Mongolyn ardyn khuv'sgalt namyn negdügeer ikh khural [First congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party], (Ulan Bator, 1971).
- Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, the Mukden Military Clique, and Japan, 1920â1928 (PhD dissertation, London University, 1974), p. 55.
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