Summit of Strategy
An in-depth academic exploration of the pivotal 1943 meeting of the 'Big Three' Allied leaders that shaped World War II strategy and the post-war world.
Explore the Conference 👇 Key Decisions 📜Dive in with Flashcard Learning!
🎮 Play the Wiki2Web Clarity Challenge Game🎮
Conference Overview
The First 'Big Three' Meeting
The Tehran Conference, codenamed "Eureka," represented the inaugural strategy meeting among the "Big Three" Allied leaders of World War II: Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, and Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom. This crucial summit convened from November 28 to December 1, 1943, in Tehran, Iran, which was then under Allied occupation. It followed closely after the Cairo Conference, a separate discussion involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and China.
Setting the Stage in Tehran
The conference was hosted in Allied-occupied Iran, specifically at the Soviet embassy in Tehran. This location was chosen after Stalin expressed reluctance to travel far from Moscow and his unwillingness to risk air travel, ultimately agreeing to Tehran after declining offers for Cairo, Baghdad, or Basra. The choice of venue underscored the complex logistical and political considerations of wartime diplomacy, with Roosevelt notably arriving on the USS Iowa.
Primary Objectives
While each leader arrived with distinct objectives, the paramount outcome was a firm commitment from Britain and America to establish a second front against Nazi Germany. This strategic decision aimed to alleviate the immense pressure on the Soviet forces on the Eastern Front. Beyond this, discussions encompassed the Allies' relationships with Turkey and Iran, military operations in Yugoslavia and against Japan, and the foundational principles for a post-war settlement following the anticipated defeat of the Axis powers. A significant diplomatic gesture was the pledge by the Big Three to uphold Iranian independence.
Historical Context
Early Allied Cooperation
The genesis of this high-level meeting can be traced back to June 1941, when the German-Soviet War erupted. Winston Churchill promptly extended assistance to the Soviets, formalizing this support with an agreement on July 12, 1941. However, Churchill, in his public address, made it clear that this alliance was purely strategic against a common enemy and did not signify a shift in his anti-communist stance. Following the United States' entry into the war in December 1941, a Combined Chiefs of Staff committee was established to synchronize British and American military operations and their aid to the Soviet Union.
Emerging Suspicions and Strategic Divides
Despite the necessity of alliance, the complexities of a global conflict, coupled with the absence of a unified Allied strategy, fostered mutual suspicions among the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Key points of contention included the urgent Soviet demand for a second front in Europe to relieve pressure on the Red Army, and the allocation of resources. Both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union sought credit and material support from the United States, leading to friction, particularly as the Americans were wary of inadvertently bolstering the British Empire post-victory. Furthermore, neither the U.S. nor the U.K. was prepared to grant Stalin unfettered influence in Eastern Europe, and a common policy for post-war Germany remained elusive. These critical issues necessitated direct, face-to-face negotiations.
Leaders' Journeys
The logistical challenges of bringing the leaders together were considerable. Stalin, known for his reluctance to travel far from Moscow and his aversion to air travel, eventually agreed to Tehran in November 1943 after declining alternative locations like Cairo, Baghdad, or Basra. His journey involved a train ride to Baku, followed by an air trip, where he notably chose the aircraft piloted by a colonel over one by a colonel-general, remarking on the rarity of such piloting. Roosevelt, physically disabled, also found travel arduous. Churchill, a more seasoned traveler, had already met Roosevelt five times in North America and twice in Africa, and Stalin twice in Moscow, highlighting the unique nature of this tripartite summit.
Conference Proceedings
The Leaders Convene
The conference officially commenced at 16:00 on November 28, 1943. Joseph Stalin arrived early, followed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was transported in his wheelchair from his adjacent accommodation. This marked the first personal encounter between Roosevelt and Stalin. Winston Churchill, accompanied by his general staff, arrived approximately thirty minutes later from his nearby lodgings. The initial meeting set a formal yet anticipatory tone for the critical discussions that were to follow.
Key Attendees and Delegations
The principal leaders were supported by their respective delegations. Roosevelt was accompanied by Harry Hopkins, his personal emissary to Churchill, and W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Stalin's retinue included Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and military leader Kliment Voroshilov. Churchill brought Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, his Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CGS) Alanbrooke, chief military assistant Hastings Ismay, along with Dill, Cunningham, Portal, Boyle, and his interpreter Arthur Birse. Notably, three Western women were present: Churchill's daughter Sarah, Averell Harriman's daughter Kathleen, and Roosevelt's daughter Anna Boettiger, adding a unique dimension to the otherwise male-dominated wartime diplomacy.
Diplomatic Engagements with Iran
During the conference, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, met with both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. These meetings occurred shortly after his father's forced abdication during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. These interactions underscored the Allied powers' presence and influence in Iran, a neutral country that had been occupied by both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in August 1941. The discussions with the Shah were part of the broader diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region and secure Allied interests.
Strategic Decisions
The Second Front: Operation Overlord
A central point of contention and ultimate agreement was the opening of a second front in Western Europe. Stalin had been advocating for this since 1941 to relieve pressure on the Eastern Front. Churchill initially favored expanding operations in the Mediterranean, citing logistical constraints for a cross-channel invasion in 1943. However, the leaders ultimately reached a consensus: Operation Overlord, the invasion of northern France by American and British forces, would be launched by May 1944. In a coordinated effort, Stalin pledged that Soviet forces would initiate Operation Bagration, a major offensive on the Eastern Front, concurrently to prevent German forces from redeploying to the West. This decision was pivotal in shaping the remainder of the war.
Post-War Poland and Germany
Discussions also delved into the post-war geopolitical landscape, particularly concerning Poland's future borders. Stalin pressed for a revision of Poland's eastern border with the Soviet Union, aligning it with the Curzon Line established in 1920. To compensate Poland for this territorial loss, the leaders agreed to shift the German-Polish border westward to the Oder and Neisse rivers. This plan aimed to provide Poland with industrialized German land and create a territorial buffer for the Soviet Union. Roosevelt, mindful of Polish voters in the upcoming 1944 U.S. election, requested to be excused from formal discussions on Poland. These decisions, though agreed upon in principle, were not formally ratified until the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. The USSR had also unilaterally withdrawn recognition of the Polish government-in-exile prior to the conference, conducting negotiations covertly.
Regional Engagements: Turkey and Iran
The status of Turkey and Iran was also a significant agenda item. The Big Three agreed to support the Iranian government, acknowledging the economic hardships caused by the war and pledging continued economic assistance, considering global military demands and resource shortages. Furthermore, the leaders deemed it highly desirable for Turkey to join the war on the Allied side before the year's end. To incentivize this, they agreed to offer Turkey the islands of Crete and the Dodecanese, strategically located near Turkey. Stalin also stated that if Turkey entered the war and Bulgaria subsequently attacked Turkey, the Soviet Union would immediately declare war on Bulgaria, a point to be used in negotiations with Turkey.
Military Coordination and Deception
To ensure the success of the impending European operations, the leaders agreed to maintain close contact among their military staffs. A critical aspect of this coordination was the development of a cover plan designed to mislead the enemy about the timing and scale of the Allied offensives. This emphasis on deception highlights the strategic sophistication of the Allied command at this stage of the war.
Consequential Outcomes
Support for Yugoslav Partisans
A direct result of the conference was the full Allied support extended to the Yugoslav Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito. Concurrently, Allied support for the Yugoslav Chetniks was discontinued, as they were perceived to be collaborating with the occupying Italian and German forces rather than actively resisting them. This shift in policy significantly bolstered the communist Partisans, who subsequently gained power in Yugoslavia as German forces gradually withdrew from the Balkans in 1944 and 1945.
Turkey's Entry into the War
Following discussions at the Cairo Conference and Tehran, Turkish President İsmet İnönü conferred with Roosevelt and Churchill. He pledged Turkey's entry into the war once the country was fully armed. By August 1944, Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and in February 1945, it declared war on both Germany and Japan. While largely a symbolic gesture at that late stage of the conflict, this move was crucial in allowing Turkey to participate in the formation of the future United Nations.
Genesis of the United Nations
The Tehran Conference also marked one of the earliest substantive discussions regarding the establishment of the United Nations. Roosevelt introduced Stalin to the concept of a global organization comprising all nation-states, designed to resolve common issues and act as a deterrent against international aggressors. With Germany having plunged the world into chaos twice in a generation, all three leaders concurred on the imperative to prevent future conflicts of such magnitude, laying foundational ideas for the post-war international order.
Post-War Germany: Division and Influence
A shared, albeit varied, perspective among the participants was the necessity of dividing Germany after the war to neutralize its capacity for future aggression. While the specific proposals for the number of divisions differed widely and were never fully realized as initially conceived, the conference set the stage for the effective division of modern Germany into two distinct entities, a status that persisted until the end of the Cold War. During one dinner, when Churchill inquired about Stalin's post-war territorial ambitions, Stalin cryptically responded, "There is no need to speak at this present time about any Soviet Desires, but when the time comes we will speak."
Soviet Commitment to the Pacific War
On November 29, Roosevelt sought information from Stalin regarding Japanese and Siberian ports and potential air bases in the Maritime Provinces for up to 1,000 heavy bombers. Stalin subsequently informed the American ambassador on February 2 that the United States could operate 1,000 bombers from Siberia once the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. This commitment was a significant strategic gain for the Allies, promising a multi-front assault on Japan after the defeat of Germany.
Alleged Assassination Plot
Operation Long Jump
Soviet intelligence reports alleged that German agents had planned to assassinate the "Big Three" leaders during the Tehran Conference, an operation supposedly codenamed "Long Jump." The NKVD, the Soviet counterintelligence unit, reportedly informed Mike Reilly, Roosevelt's chief of security, of the suspected plot several days before Roosevelt's arrival. Reilly, who was in Tehran to assess security, was told that dozens of German agents had been parachuted into the city, with the NKVD expressing concerns for the leaders' safety.
Roosevelt's Relocation
Initially, Roosevelt intended to stay at the American legation to maintain an appearance of neutrality between his allies, despite invitations from both Stalin and Churchill to stay with them. However, close to midnight on November 27, Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's senior aide, summoned the British and American ambassadors, Archibald Clark-Kerr and Averell Harriman, to the Soviet embassy. Molotov warned them of the assassination plot, claiming some assassins had been apprehended but others were still at large, and advised Roosevelt to move to the safety of either the British or Soviet embassy.
Suspicions and Strategic Moves
American officials, including Mike Reilly and Averell Harriman, harbored suspicions that Stalin might have fabricated or exaggerated the assassination plot. They believed his motive was to persuade Roosevelt to relocate to the Soviet embassy, thereby ensuring Stalin's own safety within his heavily guarded compound and facilitating easier surveillance of the American president. Harriman, while doubting the plot's credibility, urged Roosevelt to move to avoid any perception of endangering Churchill or Stalin by making them travel across the city for meetings. Roosevelt, prioritizing closer access to Stalin and Churchill and recognizing the security benefits, agreed to the move. The Soviet embassy, adjacent to the British embassy, provided a secure meeting location, guarded by thousands of secret police.
Historical Ambiguity
After the conference, Harriman directly questioned Molotov about the assassination threat. Molotov's response downplayed the existence of a specific plot, instead emphasizing Stalin's belief that Roosevelt would be safer at the Soviet embassy. Subsequent American and British intelligence reports generally dismissed the plot's existence. Otto Skorzeny, the alleged leader of the German operation, later claimed that Hitler had deemed the idea unworkable even before planning began. Despite these assessments, the alleged plot continues to be a subject of discussion among certain Russian historians, highlighting the enduring intrigue surrounding wartime intelligence and diplomacy.
Teacher's Corner
Edit and Print this course in the Wiki2Web Teacher Studio

Click here to open the "Tehran Conference" Wiki2Web Studio curriculum kit
Use the free Wiki2web Studio to generate printable flashcards, worksheets, exams, and export your materials as a web page or an interactive game.
True or False?
Test Your Knowledge!
Gamer's Corner
Are you ready for the Wiki2Web Clarity Challenge?

Unlock the mystery image and prove your knowledge by earning trophies. This simple game is addictively fun and is a great way to learn!
Play now
References
References
- McNeill, W. H. (1953) American, Britain and Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 353.
- McNeill, W. H. (1953) America, Britain, and Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941â1946. Oxford University Press. pp. 388â90
Feedback & Support
To report an issue with this page, or to find out ways to support the mission, please click here.
Disclaimer
Important Notice
This page was generated by an Artificial Intelligence and is intended for informational and educational purposes only. The content is based on a snapshot of publicly available data from Wikipedia and may not be entirely accurate, complete, or up-to-date.
This is not professional historical or political advice. The information provided on this website is not a substitute for rigorous academic research, consultation with professional historians, or expert analysis of geopolitical events. Always refer to primary sources, peer-reviewed historical scholarship, and consult with qualified professionals for in-depth understanding and critical evaluation. Never disregard established academic consensus or professional historical analysis because of something you have read on this website.
The creators of this page are not responsible for any errors or omissions, or for any actions taken based on the information provided herein.