Operation Zeebrugge: A Study in Naval Audacity

🚢 The Objective

The Zeebrugge Raid, executed on April 23, 1918, represented a critical Royal Navy endeavor to blockade the Belgian port of Bruges-Zeebrugge. The primary strategic goal was to scuttle obsolete vessels within the canal entrance, thereby preventing German naval assets, particularly U-boats, from egressing the port. This action was deemed imperative due to the significant threat posed by the Imperial German Navy's Flanders U-boat flotillas and light shipping to Allied control of the English Channel and the southern North Sea.

🗓️ A Desperate Measure

Prior to this audacious raid, several attempts to neutralize the Flanders ports through sustained bombardment had proven unsuccessful. Furthermore, "Operation Hush," a 1917 plan for a coastal advance, had been aborted. As Allied shipping losses to U-boats escalated, the urgency to find an effective method to close these critical German bases intensified, leading the Admiralty to consider more direct and high-risk operations like the Zeebrugge Raid.

📉 Initial Outcome

Despite the meticulous planning and valorous execution, the immediate tactical success of the raid was limited. Two of the three designated blockships were scuttled, but critically, they were positioned incorrectly within the Bruges–Ostend Canal. Additionally, one of two explosive-laden submarines successfully rammed and destroyed the viaduct connecting the shore to the mole, aiming to trap the German garrison. However, within days, German forces managed to clear a channel, allowing U-boats to pass at high tide. Nevertheless, valuable lessons were gleaned from this operation, which would later inform naval strategies in the Second World War.

💣 Bombardment Challenges

Prior to the raid, Vice-Admiral Bacon had meticulously planned to destroy the Zeebrugge lock gates through bombardment. This involved using the formidable 15-inch guns of monitors such as HMS Erebus, HMS Terror, and HMS Marshal Soult. The target, a mere 90 by 30 square feet, was to be engaged from a range of 13 nautical miles, relying on artillery-observation aircraft for accuracy. Bacon estimated that 252 shells, fired over 84 minutes, would be necessary, emphasizing the need for surprise and a precisely directed smokescreen to shield the bombardment ships from German coastal batteries.

💨 The Smokescreen Dilemma

The success of these bombardments hinged on a rare confluence of favorable wind, tide, and weather conditions. Any deviation in wind direction could render the smokescreen ineffective, exposing the British fleet to devastating German fire. Several attempts to execute the bombardment were aborted due to these stringent meteorological requirements. For instance, on May 12, 1917, a bombardment of Zeebrugge was hampered by haze, unexploded shells, and the loss of observation aircraft, resulting in limited damage and the port remaining operational for German destroyers and U-boats.

🌊 Ostend Engagement

Following the inconclusive Zeebrugge attempt, Bacon prepared to bombard Ostend harbor. On June 5, 1917, a smaller bombardment force, supported by a larger covering force, engaged Ostend. Despite German destroyer interference that complicated range-finding, the bombardment commenced, with German coastal guns responding accurately but without significant effect on the British monitors. The operation resulted in hits on the dockyard, the sinking of a lighter and a UC-boat, and damage to three destroyers, causing anxiety within the German command regarding coastal security. However, subsequent planned bombardments were postponed due to unfavorable conditions, allowing the Germans to repair the damage.

🤝 Call for Volunteers

In February 1918, a discreet appeal was issued to the Grand Fleet for volunteers for "special service." The nature of the mission was kept highly confidential, with very few participants privy to the actual objective. This secrecy fostered a sense of mystery and adventure, attracting numerous eager volunteers. Accounts from participants, such as Leading Stoker Norbert McCrory and Lieutenant Commander Ronald Boddie, highlight the overwhelming response and the rigorous selection process for the chosen few.

⚙️ Ship Modifications

The selected vessels underwent extensive modifications to prepare for the unique demands of the raid. Cruisers designated for the blockade, including HMS Vindictive, were refitted at Chatham by over 2,000 workers. This involved special outfitting for assault roles or, in the case of ships intended for scuttling, stripping out all unnecessary equipment, including their masts. Similarly, the Mersey ferries Iris and Daffodil, along with the submarines, were converted at Portsmouth to fulfill their specific roles in the operation.

🌬️ The First Abort

The assembled fleet converged at Swin Deep, approximately 8 nautical miles south of Clacton, awaiting the opportune moment. The initial window for the raid presented itself in early April 1918. On April 2, the fleet sailed, and Zeebrugge was subjected to bombing by 65 Squadron from Dunkirk. However, the critical element of the plan—the smokescreen to shield the British ships from German coastal artillery—was compromised by an unfavorable wind direction. Consequently, the attack was called off at the last moment, forcing 77 ships of various sizes to make a sharp turn back to their bases, a visible retreat that revealed the fleet's presence to the Germans.

🔍 Post-Raid Analysis

Official historical accounts, such as Sir Henry Newbolt's 1931 work, reveal that the immediate impact on German U-boat operations was minimal. Despite the sinking of the blockships, U-boat traffic from the Flanders bases continued at its pre-raid rate for the week following the operation. The Germans swiftly adapted by removing two piers on the western bank of the canal near the scuttled vessels and dredging a new channel through the silt near their sterns. This ingenious countermeasure allowed U-boats to navigate past the obstructions at high tide, effectively negating the intended blockade.

📈 Long-Term Impact

While the initial blockade was circumvented, the rate of U-boat passages did eventually decline, particularly after a subsequent bombardment of Zeebrugge on June 9. Newbolt posited that this reduction was partly attributable to the recall of some U-boats to Germany, prompted by reports of increased danger in the Dover Straits. The raid, therefore, contributed to a broader anti-submarine campaign that, through patrols and minefields, aimed to make the Straits too perilous for German U-boats. The Zeebrugge Raid, despite its tactical shortcomings, was skillfully leveraged for Allied propaganda, boosting morale with the Latin maxim, "They can because they think they can" (Possunt quia posse videntur).

🔄 Lessons Learned

The experiences gained from the Zeebrugge operation directly influenced subsequent naval planning. The concurrent attack on Ostend, however, proved to be an outright failure. This led to the Second Ostend Raid on May 9, where lessons from Zeebrugge were applied, resulting in the scuttling of Vindictive and another cruiser, HMS Sappho, as blockships. Admiral Bacon, in his 1931 reflections, attributed some operational failures to Rear-Admiral Keyes's alterations to his original plans, highlighting the complexities of command and strategy in such high-stakes endeavors.

🏆 Victoria Cross Awards

The Zeebrugge Raid, despite its mixed tactical results, was heralded by Allied propaganda as a significant British victory, a narrative that greatly boosted public morale. In recognition of the extraordinary bravery displayed, eight Victoria Crosses (VCs) were awarded. The 4th Battalion Royal Marines was collectively honored with the Victoria Cross for their actions. Uniquely, this was the last occasion where Victoria Crosses were awarded by ballot, a rule that, though remaining in the VC warrant, was not fully observed in this instance, with only two VCs being selected this way instead of the stipulated four.

🎖️ Distinguished Recipients

Among the distinguished recipients of the Victoria Cross were Able Seaman Albert Edward McKenzie of Vindictive and Captain Alfred Carpenter, the commander of Vindictive. Posthumous VCs were awarded to Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Harrison and Lieutenant-Commander George Bradford, who led raiding parties from Vindictive and Iris II, respectively. Sergeant Norman Finch of the Royal Marine Artillery was chosen by ballot from the 4th Battalion. Additionally, Richard Sandford, commander of the submarine C3, and Captain Edward Bamford, who led the 4th Battalion, were also recognized with the Victoria Cross for their exceptional courage and leadership during the raid. In a lasting tribute to their valor, the Royal Marines have never since reconstituted a 4th Battalion.

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