The Agreed Framework, signed in 1994 between the United States and North Korea, primarily aimed to freeze North Korea's indigenous nuclear power program and facilitate the replacement of its reactors with proliferation-resistant alternatives.

Answer: True

The primary objective of the Agreed Framework was to freeze North Korea's existing nuclear program and replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors, thereby enhancing non-proliferation efforts, rather than assisting in the development of its indigenous program.

The Agreed Framework was signed on October 21, 1994, by representatives of North Korea and South Korea.

Answer: False

The Agreed Framework was signed on October 21, 1994, between the United States and North Korea (DPRK), not South Korea.

The Agreed Framework was signed by Robert Gallucci for the DPRK and Kang Sok-ju for the United States.

Answer: False

Robert Gallucci represented the United States, while Kang Sok-ju represented the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) when signing the Agreed Framework.

The Agreed Framework was considered a formal treaty requiring ratification by the U.S. Senate.

Answer: False

The Agreed Framework was characterized as a voluntary, non-binding political agreement, not a formal treaty, and thus did not require Senate ratification.

Before the Agreed Framework was signed, the U.S. planned to bomb the active nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

Answer: True

Prior to the signing of the Agreed Framework, the United States had developed plans to bomb the active nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The agreement served to avert this potential military intervention.

What was the principal objective of the Agreed Framework signed in 1994?

Answer: To freeze North Korea's nuclear program and replace its reactors with proliferation-resistant ones.

The principal objective of the Agreed Framework was to freeze North Korea's existing nuclear program, particularly its plutonium production capabilities, and to facilitate the replacement of its graphite-moderated reactors with proliferation-resistant light water reactors.

Which two parties were the primary signatories of the Agreed Framework?

Answer: The United States and North Korea

The primary signatories of the Agreed Framework were the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Who represented the United States and North Korea, respectively, when signing the Agreed Framework?

Answer: Robert Gallucci (USA) and Kang Sok-ju (DPRK)

The Agreed Framework was signed by Ambassador Robert Gallucci for the United States and Vice Minister Kang Sok-ju for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

How was the Agreed Framework legally characterized, and what was its context?

Answer: It was a voluntary, non-binding agreement not requiring Senate approval.

The Agreed Framework was characterized as a voluntary, non-binding political agreement, not a formal treaty. Consequently, it did not require ratification by the U.S. Senate.

Under the Agreed Framework, the United States committed to providing North Korea with 500,000 tons of plutonium annually.

Answer: False

The United States committed to providing North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, not plutonium.

North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework included freezing its graphite-moderated reactors and remaining a party to the NPT.

Answer: True

North Korea committed to freezing its graphite-moderated reactors and remaining a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as part of the Agreed Framework.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was solely responsible for negotiating the terms of the Agreed Framework.

Answer: False

KEDO's primary role was to implement the energy-related provisions of the Agreed Framework, specifically overseeing the construction of the light water reactors, not to negotiate its terms.

Confidential minutes attached to the Agreed Framework stipulated that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied only after the LWRs were fully operational.

Answer: False

The confidential minutes stipulated that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed, but crucially, before the delivery of key nuclear components.

Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to dismantle its operational 5 MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon immediately.

Answer: False

North Korea committed to freezing its graphite-moderated reactors, including the 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon, rather than dismantling it immediately. Dismantlement was contingent upon the completion of the LWR project.

The estimated cost for the two light water reactors was $4 billion, with Japan being the primary supplier.

Answer: False

The estimated cost for the two LWRs was $4 billion. South Korea, not Japan, served as the primary supplier for this project.

What was the United States' primary energy-related commitment under the Agreed Framework?

Answer: To supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually.

The United States committed to providing North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually as an interim energy source and to arrange for the construction of two light water reactors (LWRs).

Which of the following was a key commitment made by North Korea under the Agreed Framework?

Answer: To freeze its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors.

North Korea committed to freezing its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors, which were capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, and to remain a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as part of the Agreed Framework.

What was the primary function of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)?

Answer: To oversee the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea.

KEDO's primary role was not to negotiate the terms of the Agreed Framework but to implement its energy-related provisions, specifically overseeing the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea.

According to the confidential minutes of the Agreed Framework, when were full-scope IAEA safeguards supposed to be applied?

Answer: When major non-nuclear components of the first LWR were completed, before key nuclear component delivery.

The confidential minutes stipulated that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed, but crucially, before the delivery of key nuclear components for the reactor.

Under the Agreed Framework, what was North Korea supposed to do with its spent nuclear fuel?

Answer: Allow the IAEA to monitor its canning and sealing.

North Korea committed to allowing the IAEA to monitor the canning and sealing of its spent nuclear fuel, a measure designed to prevent its reprocessing for weapons-grade plutonium.

What was the estimated cost of the light water reactors to be built in North Korea?

Answer: $4 billion

The estimated cost for the two LWRs was $4 billion.

IAEA inspections in 1992 revealed that North Korea's declared nuclear materials perfectly matched the Agency's analytical findings, confirming full transparency.

Answer: False

IAEA inspections in 1992 uncovered inconsistencies, indicating a mismatch between declared plutonium and nuclear waste figures, suggesting the existence of undeclared materials.

North Korea's refusal to grant the IAEA access to specific sites led directly to its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993.

Answer: True

The refusal to allow IAEA access to certain sites prompted North Korea to announce its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993.

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was permanently halted following negotiations with the IAEA in June 1993.

Answer: False

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was temporarily suspended, not permanently halted, in June 1993 when it announced it would 'suspend the effectuation' of its withdrawal.

The 5 MWe pilot nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, operational since 1986, was primarily used for research and not capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

Answer: False

The 5 MWe pilot nuclear reactor at Yongbyon was capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, which was a primary concern addressed by the Agreed Framework's objective to freeze such activities.

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a subsequent agreement made after the Agreed Framework to address nuclear issues.

Answer: False

The 1992 Joint Declaration was an agreement made *prior* to the Agreed Framework. It aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and a commitment to implement it was included in the subsequent Agreed Framework.

Plutonium is a key component for nuclear weapons and was a primary concern because North Korea's graphite reactors could produce it.

Answer: True

Plutonium is a key fissile material used in nuclear weapons. North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors were capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, making their potential diversion for military purposes a primary concern.

What discovery by the IAEA in 1992 raised concerns about North Korea's nuclear declarations?

Answer: A mismatch suggesting undeclared plutonium existed alongside declared materials.

IAEA inspections in 1992 revealed a discrepancy between North Korea's declared plutonium production and nuclear waste figures and the Agency's analytical findings, suggesting the presence of undeclared materials.

North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA access to specific sites led to what immediate action?

Answer: North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

North Korea's refusal to grant the IAEA access to certain sites led directly to its announcement on March 12, 1993, of its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

How did North Korea's potential withdrawal from the NPT get temporarily halted?

Answer: By agreeing to suspend the effectuation of its withdrawal in June 1993.

North Korea's potential withdrawal from the NPT was temporarily suspended when it announced it would 'suspend the effectuation' of its withdrawal in June 1993, following diplomatic pressure and UN Security Council Resolution 825.

What was the purpose of the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?

Answer: To aim for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The 1992 Joint Declaration was an agreement between South and North Korea aimed at achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

What is the primary concern regarding 'plutonium' in the context of North Korea's nuclear program?

Answer: It is a key component used in the creation of nuclear weapons.

Plutonium is a key fissile material used in nuclear weapons. North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors were capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, making their potential diversion for military purposes a primary concern for international security and a central issue addressed by the Agreed Framework.

In November 1993, North Korea proposed a 'package solution' to the United States, which was accepted unconditionally.

Answer: False

The Clinton Administration accepted North Korea's 'package solution' in principle, but with the crucial condition that North Korea first allow IAEA inspections and restart talks with South Korea.

As a concession in early 1994, the United States agreed to continue the annual Team Spirit military exercise with South Korea to encourage North Korean cooperation.

Answer: False

In early 1994, as a concession to encourage North Korean cooperation, the United States agreed to suspend, not continue, the annual Team Spirit military exercise with South Korea.

The United States directly funded the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea through Congressional appropriations.

Answer: False

While the U.S. committed to arranging the construction of LWRs through KEDO, U.S. Congressional appropriations for direct funding were ultimately rejected. Funding was primarily sourced from other consortium members.

Both the United States and North Korea viewed the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement.

Answer: False

The United States primarily viewed the Agreed Framework as a non-proliferation agreement, while North Korea placed greater emphasis on the normalization of political and economic relations.

U.S. officials expected the Agreed Framework to stabilize the North Korean regime following Kim Il Sung's death.

Answer: False

Some U.S. officials reportedly anticipated that the North Korean regime might collapse following the death of Kim Il Sung, rather than stabilize, which influenced their approach to the Agreed Framework.

The Republican Party's control of the U.S. Congress after 1994 generally supported the Agreed Framework and ensured consistent funding.

Answer: False

The Republican Party's ascendancy in Congress after 1994 generally led to opposition to the Agreed Framework, creating significant challenges in securing consistent funding for its implementation.

Transitional oil supplies to North Korea were initially funded by the U.S. Department of Defense to bypass congressional control.

Answer: True

Initially, transitional oil supplies were funded through emergency allocations from the U.S. Department of Defense to circumvent congressional oversight. Subsequent congressional funding proved inconsistent, leading to delivery delays.

The U.S. successfully lifted all economic sanctions against North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework implementation.

Answer: False

The United States ultimately failed to lift all economic sanctions against North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework implementation, a failure that contributed to the agreement's breakdown.

Delays in the LWR project, including late invitations to bid, caused North Korea to warn it would restart its nuclear research by May 1998.

Answer: True

Significant delays in the LWR project, notably the late issuance of invitations to bid, led North Korea to issue a warning in May 1998 that it would resume its nuclear research activities if the United States did not proceed with the installation of the LWRs.

In 1998, U.S. officials testified to Congress that North Korea was fundamentally violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program.

Answer: False

In 1998, U.S. officials testified to Congress that North Korea had not fundamentally violated the Agreed Framework. However, it was later revealed that the U.S. was aware of North Korea's activities related to a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program beginning around that time.

Robert Gallucci warned that the Agreed Framework was robust and unlikely to collapse even if U.S. obligations were not met.

Answer: False

Robert Gallucci, a key negotiator of the Agreed Framework, warned that the agreement's stability was contingent upon the United States fulfilling its obligations, suggesting it was not inherently robust against non-compliance.

Disagreements over the normalization of relations contributed to the Agreed Framework's breakdown, as the U.S. made significant progress in establishing full diplomatic ties by 1999.

Answer: False

Disagreements over the normalization of relations were a significant factor in the Agreed Framework's collapse. The United States made minimal progress in establishing full diplomatic and economic ties by 1999, which North Korea viewed as a failure to uphold a key commitment.

The 'Team Spirit' exercise was a series of diplomatic talks held between the U.S. and North Korea to resolve nuclear disputes.

Answer: False

The 'Team Spirit' exercise was a joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea. As a concession to encourage North Korean cooperation, the U.S. agreed to suspend this exercise in early 1994.

What condition did the Clinton Administration place on accepting North Korea's proposed 'package solution' in November 1993?

Answer: North Korea must first allow IAEA inspections and restart talks with South Korea.

The Clinton Administration accepted North Korea's proposed 'package solution' in principle, but with the crucial condition that North Korea first allow the resumption of IAEA inspections and initiate nuclear dialogue with South Korea.

Which of the following was a concession made by the United States in early 1994 to encourage North Korean cooperation?

Answer: Suspending the annual Team Spirit military exercise with South Korea.

In early 1994, as a concession to encourage North Korean cooperation with IAEA inspections, the United States agreed to suspend the annual Team Spirit military exercise conducted with South Korea.

What was the primary emphasis for North Korea regarding the Agreed Framework, contrasting with the U.S. view?

Answer: North Korea emphasized normalization of relations, while the U.S. focused on non-proliferation.

The United States primarily viewed the Agreed Framework as a non-proliferation agreement aimed at curbing North Korea's nuclear ambitions. North Korea, however, placed greater emphasis on the framework's provisions for the normalization of political and economic relations with the U.S.

What did some U.S. officials initially expect might happen to the North Korean government following Kim Il Sung's death?

Answer: It would collapse.

Some U.S. officials reportedly anticipated that the North Korean regime might collapse following the death of Kim Il Sung, rather than stabilize, which influenced their approach to the Agreed Framework.

How did the Republican takeover of the U.S. Congress after 1994 impact the Agreed Framework?

Answer: It created challenges in securing consistent funding due to opposition.

The Republican Party's ascendancy in Congress after 1994 generally led to opposition to the Agreed Framework, creating significant challenges in securing consistent funding for its implementation.

What was a significant failure of the U.S. regarding economic sanctions that affected the Agreed Framework's implementation?

Answer: The U.S. failed to lift existing sanctions as expected by North Korea.

The United States ultimately failed to lift all economic sanctions against North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework implementation, a failure that contributed to the agreement's breakdown.

What warning did North Korea issue in May 1998 concerning the delays in the LWR project?

Answer: It would restart its nuclear research.

Significant delays in the LWR project, notably the late issuance of invitations to bid, led North Korea to issue a warning in May 1998 that it would resume its nuclear research activities if the United States did not proceed with the installation of the LWRs.

What did U.S. officials report to Congress in 1998 regarding North Korea's compliance with the Agreed Framework?

Answer: North Korea had not fundamentally violated any aspect of the agreement.

In 1998, U.S. officials testified to Congress that North Korea had not fundamentally violated the Agreed Framework. However, it was later revealed that the U.S. was aware of North Korea's activities related to a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program beginning around that time.

In January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush praised North Korea's cooperation under the Agreed Framework in his State of the Union Address.

Answer: False

Contrary to praising cooperation, President George W. Bush's January 2002 State of the Union Address designated North Korea as part of an 'Axis of Evil.' This rhetoric significantly heightened tensions and negatively impacted the relationship.

During an October 2002 meeting, North Korean officials admitted to possessing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program to U.S. delegation leader James A. Kelly.

Answer: False

During the October 2002 meeting, the U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, interpreted statements from North Korean officials as an admission of possessing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

North Korea denied having an HEU program in October 2002 and asserted its sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons for defense.

Answer: True

In October 2002, North Korean representatives denied the U.S. claims of possessing an HEU program, characterizing the assertions as arrogant and lacking evidence. They asserted their sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.

The CIA presented conclusive proof in November 2002 that North Korea had completed a production-scale centrifuge facility for HEU.

Answer: False

In November 2002, the CIA presented evidence suggesting North Korea had begun constructing a production-scale centrifuge facility for HEU. However, this assessment faced scrutiny from some experts who questioned the sufficiency of the evidence.

KEDO halted fuel oil shipments to North Korea in December 2002 in response to the alleged HEU program.

Answer: True

In December 2002, KEDO halted fuel oil shipments to North Korea, a critical step in the agreement's breakdown, in response to the U.S. allegations of an HEU program.

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT for the first time in January 2003.

Answer: False

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT for the second time on January 10, 2003. The first announcement of withdrawal occurred in March 1993.

In December 2003, KEDO decided to continue full-scale construction of the LWR project in North Korea.

Answer: False

In December 2003, KEDO decided to suspend work on the LWR project in North Korea. The organization subsequently focused on preserving and maintaining the project's assets.

The Agreed Framework successfully prevented North Korea from developing any nuclear weapons capability, including secret programs.

Answer: False

The Agreed Framework achieved a significant success by freezing North Korea's plutonium production for approximately eight years (1994-2002). However, it ultimately failed to prevent the development of a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

The Six-party talks led to a final accord requiring North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, but it did not address the HEU issue.

Answer: True

The Six-Party Talks resulted in a preliminary accord in September 2005, which required North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities. However, this accord did not directly address the U.S. concerns regarding North Korea's secret enriched uranium (HEU) program.

KEDO officially terminated the LWR construction project in May 2006.

Answer: True

KEDO officially terminated the LWR construction project on May 31, 2006.

The 'Axis of Evil' designation by President Bush was seen as a positive step that improved trust between the U.S. and North Korea.

Answer: False

The 'Axis of Evil' designation by President Bush in January 2002 significantly escalated tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, creating a hostile environment that undermined trust and contributed to the breakdown of the Agreed Framework.

The Agreed Framework successfully froze North Korea's plutonium production for approximately eight years.

Answer: True

The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korea's plutonium production for approximately eight years, from 1994 until the program's alleged resumption around December 2002.

North Korea accused the United States of a 'friendly policy' and timely fulfillment of obligations, which led to the framework's breakdown.

Answer: False

North Korea's stated reasons for the framework's failure included the U.S. 'Axis of Evil' designation, delays in fuel oil and reactor construction, and perceived threats, which they characterized as a hostile policy, contrary to the expected friendly engagement.

What was the significance of President George W. Bush's 'Axis of Evil' designation in January 2002?

Answer: It significantly heightened tensions and negatively impacted the relationship.

The 'Axis of Evil' designation by President Bush in January 2002 significantly escalated tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, creating a hostile environment that undermined trust and contributed to the breakdown of the Agreed Framework.

What did U.S. officials believe North Korean officials admitted to during the October 2002 meeting?

Answer: Possessing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

During the October 2002 meeting, the U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, interpreted statements from North Korean officials as an admission of possessing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

How did North Korea respond to the U.S. accusations of an HEU program in October 2002?

Answer: They denied the accusations, called them arrogant, and asserted their sovereign rights.

In October 2002, North Korean representatives denied the U.S. claims of possessing an HEU program, characterizing the assertions as arrogant and lacking evidence. They asserted their sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, while simultaneously stating they did not possess them at that moment.

What action did KEDO and the U.S. take in December 2002 that marked a critical step in the agreement's breakdown?

Answer: They halted heavy fuel oil shipments.

In December 2002, KEDO halted fuel oil shipments to North Korea, a critical step in the agreement's breakdown, in response to the U.S. allegations of an HEU program.

On January 10, 2003, North Korea made which significant declaration?

Answer: It announced its withdrawal from the NPT for a second time.

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT for the second time on January 10, 2003. The first announcement of withdrawal occurred in March 1993.

What decision did KEDO make regarding the LWR project in December 2003?

Answer: To suspend work on the project and focus on asset preservation.

In December 2003, KEDO decided to suspend work on the LWR project in North Korea. The organization subsequently focused on preserving and maintaining the project's assets.

According to the source, what was the primary reason the Agreed Framework failed?

Answer: North Korea violated the agreement with a secret HEU program, while the U.S. faced political opposition to fulfilling its commitments.

The failure of the Agreed Framework is attributed to a complex interplay of factors. The United States cited North Korea's pursuit of a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program as a fundamental violation. Conversely, North Korea pointed to U.S. perceived hostility, delays in fulfilling commitments (such as fuel oil and reactor construction), and political actions like the 'Axis of Evil' designation.

When did KEDO officially terminate the LWR construction project?

Answer: May 31, 2006

KEDO officially terminated the LWR construction project on May 31, 2006.

The IAEA is the International Agency for Atomic Power, responsible for verifying nuclear material safety.

Answer: False

The IAEA is the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its mandate includes promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes.

'Light water reactors' use heavy water as a coolant and moderator and are considered more proliferation-prone than graphite reactors.

Answer: False

Light water reactors (LWRs) utilize ordinary water as their coolant and moderator and are generally considered less proliferation-prone than graphite-moderated reactors. Graphite reactors are more efficient at producing weapons-grade plutonium.

What does 'nuclear proliferation' refer to in the context of the Agreed Framework?

Answer: True

In the context of the Agreed Framework, 'nuclear proliferation' refers to the spread of nuclear weapons, related technology, and fissile materials to states that do not currently possess them, a primary concern the framework aimed to prevent.

The NPT is a treaty focused on promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Answer: True

The NPT is a landmark international treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advance nuclear disarmament.

A 'safeguards agreement' with the IAEA allows a country to develop nuclear weapons technology freely, provided it informs the agency.

Answer: False

A safeguards agreement with the IAEA permits the agency to conduct verification activities to ensure nuclear activities are peaceful and materials are not diverted for weapons development; it does not permit the free development of nuclear weapons technology.

'Highly enriched uranium' (HEU) is uranium with a low concentration of Uranium-235, making it unsuitable for nuclear weapons.

Answer: False

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is characterized by a significantly elevated concentration of the fissile isotope Uranium-235, typically at 20% or higher. This concentration makes HEU a critical component for the construction of nuclear weapons.

What is 'heavy fuel oil' as mentioned in the context of the Agreed Framework?

Answer: A fuel oil used for industrial heating and electricity generation.

Heavy fuel oil is a residual fuel derived from crude oil, commonly used for industrial heating and electricity generation. Under the Agreed Framework, it served as a substitute energy source provided to North Korea.

Why were 'light water reactors' (LWRs) considered more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite reactors?

Answer: LWRs are less efficient at producing weapons-grade plutonium.

Light water reactors (LWRs) utilize ordinary water as their coolant and moderator and are generally considered less proliferation-prone than graphite-moderated reactors. Graphite reactors, like those North Korea possessed, are more efficient at producing weapons-grade plutonium.

What does the term 'nuclear proliferation' specifically refer to in international relations?

Answer: The spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and materials.

In the context of the Agreed Framework, 'nuclear proliferation' refers to the spread of nuclear weapons, related technology, and fissile materials to states that do not currently possess them, a primary concern the framework aimed to prevent.

What is the NPT, and why was North Korea's status regarding it critical?

Answer: The Non-Proliferation Treaty; critical because North Korea threatened withdrawal and faced compliance issues.

The NPT is a landmark international treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advance nuclear disarmament. North Korea's adherence to and compliance with the NPT were critical to international non-proliferation efforts.