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Total Categories: 6
The UN's Gender Equality Doctrine is primarily based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Answer: False
The UN's Gender Equality Doctrine is primarily based on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), not the ICCPR.
Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW states that temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality are considered discriminatory.
Answer: False
Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW explicitly states that temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality shall *not* be considered discriminatory.
General Recommendation No. 25 was adopted by the UN General Assembly to clarify the application of temporary special measures.
Answer: False
General Recommendation No. 25 was adopted by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), not the UN General Assembly, to clarify the application of temporary special measures.
Quota systems are explicitly mentioned as an example of temporary special measures in General Recommendation No. 25.
Answer: True
General Recommendation No. 25 lists quota systems as one example of temporary special measures that can be employed to accelerate de facto equality.
Article 8 of the UN Charter prohibits affirmative action measures aimed at improving the status of women.
Answer: False
Article 8 of the UN Charter has been interpreted by UNAT jurisprudence as supporting reasonable affirmative action measures to improve the status of women, rather than prohibiting them.
UN Women is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CEDAW treaty and issuing related recommendations.
Answer: False
While UN Women promotes gender equality, the monitoring of the CEDAW treaty and issuance of related recommendations are primarily functions of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee).
General Recommendation No. 25 argues that temporary special measures are an exception to non-discrimination principles.
Answer: False
General Recommendation No. 25 clarifies that temporary special measures are a necessary strategy to achieve substantive equality and are not exceptions to non-discrimination principles.
Which international treaty serves as a foundational basis for the UN's Gender Equality Doctrine and its 'Special Measures'?
Answer: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
The UN's Gender Equality Doctrine and 'Special Measures' are fundamentally rooted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
What does Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW state about temporary special measures?
Answer: They shall not be considered discrimination if aimed at accelerating de facto equality.
Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW states that temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discriminatory.
Who adopted General Recommendation No. 25, which clarifies Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW?
Answer: The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee)
General Recommendation No. 25 was adopted by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) to clarify the application of Article 4, paragraph 1 of CEDAW.
Which of the following is listed as an example of 'temporary special measures' in General Recommendation No. 25?
Answer: Numerical goals connected with specific time frames
General Recommendation No. 25 lists numerical goals connected with specific time frames, alongside quota systems and targeted recruitment, as examples of temporary special measures.
What does the 'international Bill of Rights for Women' refer to?
Answer: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
The 'international Bill of Rights for Women' is another name for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
The Administrative Instruction (AI) ST/AI/1999/9 aimed to accelerate the achievement of gender equality primarily in Professional category posts within the UN Secretariat.
Answer: False
The Administrative Instruction (AI) ST/AI/1999/9 aimed to accelerate the achievement of gender equality primarily in Professional category posts, not lower-level administrative support roles.
The Gender Equality Administrative Instruction ST/AI/1999/9 became effective on January 5, 1996.
Answer: False
The Gender Equality Administrative Instruction ST/AI/1999/9 became effective on October 1, 1999, superseding the earlier instruction dated January 5, 1996.
ST/AI/1999/9 applies only to temporary posts within the UN Secretariat.
Answer: False
ST/AI/1999/9 applies to all vacant posts in the Professional category and above, including temporary posts, within the UN Secretariat.
UN Women has stated that the Gender Equality A/I (ST/AI/1999/9) will remain in effect indefinitely.
Answer: False
UN Women states that the Gender Equality A/I will remain in effect until substantial progress towards gender balance is achieved and sustained, not indefinitely.
ST/AI/1999/9 remains legally binding until it is formally amended or revoked.
Answer: True
ST/AI/1999/9 continues to be legally binding and applicable law unless it is formally amended or revoked by the UN Secretariat.
The 'Professional category' includes only P-1 to P-5 grades and excludes higher director levels.
Answer: False
The 'Professional category' encompasses grades P-1 through P-5 and extends to higher director levels (D-1, D-2) and senior leadership positions.
What was the primary objective of the UN Secretariat's Administrative Instruction (AI) ST/AI/1999/9?
Answer: To strengthen and expedite measures for achieving gender equality, particularly in Professional category posts.
The primary objective of ST/AI/1999/9 was to strengthen and expedite measures aimed at achieving gender equality, with a particular focus on Professional category posts within the UN Secretariat.
On what date did the Gender Equality Administrative Instruction ST/AI/1999/9 take effect?
Answer: October 1, 1999
The Gender Equality Administrative Instruction ST/AI/1999/9 became effective on October 1, 1999.
Which UN entity asserts that the Gender Parity Administrative Instruction will remain in effect until substantial progress towards gender balance is achieved?
Answer: UN Women
UN Women asserts that the Gender Parity Administrative Instruction (ST/AI/1999/9) will remain in effect until substantial progress towards gender balance is achieved.
Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon defined 'Special Measures' as procedures intended to maintain the status quo of gender distribution in senior UN roles.
Answer: False
Ban Ki-moon defined 'Special Measures' as procedures designed to accelerate the achievement of gender parity at Professional levels and above, not to maintain the status quo.
The Special Measures for Gender Equality are intended to be permanent fixtures within the UN personnel system, regardless of achieving parity.
Answer: False
Special Measures for Gender Equality are intended to remain in effect until the goal of gender parity is achieved and sustained, not as permanent fixtures.
Section 1.8 of ST/AI/1999/9 requires that vacancies be filled by a male candidate if his qualifications are substantially equal to a female candidate's.
Answer: False
Section 1.8 of ST/AI/1999/9 mandates that vacancies be filled by a female candidate if her qualifications are substantially equal to or superior to those of competing male candidates, provided women are under-represented.
The Office of Human Resources (OHRM) is solely responsible for implementing the special measures for gender equality.
Answer: False
While OHRM monitors implementation, the primary responsibility and accountability for implementing special measures lie with the Heads of Departments (HODs).
Section 1.8(d) of ST/AI/1999/9 requires a written justification only when a male candidate is not selected despite gender imbalance.
Answer: False
Section 1.8(d) requires a written justification particularly when a woman candidate is not selected despite prevailing gender imbalance, not solely when a male candidate is not selected.
Cumulative seniority, as defined in ST/AI/1999/9, is calculated based on the average years in the current and immediately preceding Professional grade.
Answer: True
Cumulative seniority under ST/AI/1999/9 is defined as the average of years accrued in the current and immediately preceding Professional grade.
The term 'substantially equal' means a female candidate must be significantly more qualified than male candidates to receive preferential treatment.
Answer: False
The term 'substantially equal' implies that a female candidate's qualifications must meet job requirements and be equal to or better than male candidates, not necessarily significantly more qualified.
The Steering Committee for the Improvement of the Status of Women is responsible for appointing staff under the special measures.
Answer: False
While the Steering Committee monitors and implements gender equality policies, the direct responsibility for appointing staff under special measures lies with the Heads of Departments.
ST/AI/1999/9 mandates specific procedures when women are under-represented in certain posts.
Answer: True
ST/AI/1999/9 explicitly mandates specific procedures, including the application of special measures, for the selection of staff in posts where women are under-represented.
According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's definition, what is the core purpose of 'Special Measures' concerning gender parity?
Answer: To accelerate the achievement of gender parity at Professional levels and above.
Ban Ki-moon defined Special Measures as procedures designed to accelerate the achievement of gender parity at Professional levels and above, aiming to ensure gender balance in recruitment and promotion.
Which administrative section of ST/AI/1999/9 specifically addresses the conditions under which a woman candidate should be appointed to a vacancy?
Answer: Section 1.8
Section 1.8 of ST/AI/1999/9 specifically outlines the conditions and procedures for appointing a woman candidate to a vacancy, particularly when women are under-represented.
Who holds the primary responsibility and accountability for implementing the special measures for gender equality within their departments?
Answer: The Heads of Departments (HODs)
The Heads of Departments (HODs) are primarily responsible and accountable for implementing the special measures for gender equality within their respective departments.
In the context of ST/AI/1999/9, what does 'substantially equal' qualifications imply for a female candidate?
Answer: Her qualifications must meet the job requirements and be equal to or better than male candidates.
For a female candidate, 'substantially equal' qualifications means meeting the job requirements and possessing qualifications that are equal to or better than those of competing male candidates.
What is the definition of 'cumulative seniority' used in ST/AI/1999/9?
Answer: The average of years accrued in the current and immediately preceding Professional grade.
Cumulative seniority in ST/AI/1999/9 is defined as the average of years accrued in the current and immediately preceding Professional grade.
The UN General Assembly's goal for gender distribution is to achieve a 75/25 representation favoring men across the organization.
Answer: False
The UN General Assembly's goal is to achieve a 50/50 gender distribution across the organization, not a 75/25 representation favoring men.
Gender equality in senior UN positions (D-1 and above) has been a goal since the UN's inception in 1945.
Answer: False
Gender equality in senior UN positions has been a stated goal of the UN General Assembly since 1970, not 1945.
The initial target set in 1990 for women's participation at the D-1 level and above was 50 percent by the year 2000.
Answer: False
The initial target set in 1990 was 25 percent for women's participation at the D-1 level and above by 1995, not 50 percent by 2000.
Due to slow progress, the UN General Assembly revised the target year for 50/50 representation in D-1 and above posts from 2000 to 2015.
Answer: True
The UN General Assembly revised the target year for achieving 50/50 representation in D-1 and above posts from 2000 to 2015 due to insufficient progress.
Women's representation at the D-1 level in the UN Secretariat decreased from 30.3% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2009.
Answer: True
Data indicates that women's representation at the D-1 level in the UN Secretariat decreased from 30.3% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2009.
Based on 2012 progress rates, gender parity at the D-1 level and higher was projected to be achieved in approximately 25 years.
Answer: False
Based on 2012 progress rates, gender parity at the D-1 level and higher was projected to take approximately 102 years, not 25 years.
A primary reason for failing to meet gender equality targets was the successful and timely implementation of five-year Action Plans.
Answer: False
A primary reason for failing to meet gender equality targets was the *failure* and tardy implementation of five-year Action Plans, not their successful execution.
The 'Goal' of the Special Measures is to achieve a 50/50 gender distribution across all UN levels and departments.
Answer: True
The 'Goal' of the Special Measures is indeed to achieve a 50/50 gender distribution across the entire UN organization, at all levels and in all departments.
In 2011, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee decided to discontinue the use of Special Measures to accelerate gender parity.
Answer: False
In 2011, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee decided to improve the implementation of Special Measures, not discontinue them, to accelerate gender parity.
The '50/50 gender distribution' goal applies only to entry-level positions within the UN Secretariat.
Answer: False
The 50/50 gender distribution goal applies to all levels within the UN Secretariat, including Professional categories and above, not solely entry-level positions.
What is the ultimate gender distribution goal set by the UN General Assembly for the entire UN organization?
Answer: 50% male, 50% female
The ultimate goal set by the UN General Assembly is to achieve a 50/50 gender distribution across all levels and departments of the UN organization.
Since what year has gender equality in senior UN managerial and decision-making positions been a stated goal of the UN General Assembly?
Answer: 1970
Gender equality in senior UN managerial and decision-making positions has been a stated goal of the UN General Assembly since 1970.
What was the UN General Assembly's initial target for women's participation at the D-1 level and above by 1995?
Answer: 25 percent
In 1990, the UN General Assembly urged the Secretary-General to increase women's participation at the D-1 level and above to 25 percent by 1995.
Why did the UN General Assembly revise the target year for 50/50 representation in D-1 and above posts from 2000 to 2015?
Answer: Progress in achieving gender parity in senior roles was too slow.
The target year was revised from 2000 to 2015 because progress in achieving gender parity in senior roles (D-1 and above) was too slow.
What trend was observed regarding women's representation at the D-1 level in the UN Secretariat between 2000 and 2009?
Answer: It decreased from 30.3% to 26.7%.
Women's representation at the D-1 level in the UN Secretariat decreased from 30.3% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2009.
Based on the 2012 report, what was the projected timeline for achieving gender parity at D-1 and higher levels if progress continued at the observed rate?
Answer: 102 years
According to the 2012 report, if progress continued at the observed rate, gender parity at D-1 and higher levels was projected to be achieved in 102 years.
Tribunal jurisprudence (UNAT and UNDT) has consistently rejected the legality of special measures for gender equality.
Answer: False
Tribunal jurisprudence (UNAT and UNDT) has consistently upheld the legality of special measures for gender equality, deeming them lawful and consistent with the UN Charter.
Judgement No. 671 (Grinblat, 1994) established that Article 8 of the UN Charter prohibits any measures to improve the status of women.
Answer: False
The Grinblat judgement interpreted Article 8 of the UN Charter as a basis for adopting reasonable affirmative action measures to improve the status of women, rather than prohibiting them.
The Grinblat judgement cautioned that affirmative action measures must not override the UN Charter's requirement for the highest standards of staff competence.
Answer: True
The Grinblat judgement cautioned that affirmative action measures, while permissible, cannot override Article 101(3) of the UN Charter, which mandates the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.
Judgement No. 765 (Anderson Bieler, 1996) ruled against the concept of preferential treatment for women in promotions.
Answer: False
Judgement No. 765 reaffirmed the principle of preferential treatment for women candidates whose qualifications are substantially equal to those of competing male candidates.
Judgement No. 1056 (Katz, 2002) confirmed that the Secretary-General's appointment discretion is absolute and unrestricted by UN resolutions.
Answer: False
The Katz judgement clarified that the Secretary-General's appointment discretion is not absolute but is governed by the UN Charter and relevant resolutions, including those concerning special measures.
Judgement No. 1302 (2006) required that a male candidate must be appointed if his qualifications are merely equal to a female candidate's under ST/AI/1999/9.
Answer: False
Judgement No. 1302 stipulated that a female candidate should be appointed if her qualifications are substantially equal or superior to a male candidate's, unless the male candidate's qualifications are demonstrably superior.
In the Appleton (2012) case, the UN Organization conceded that ST/AI/1999/9 was no longer applicable law.
Answer: False
In the Appleton case, the UN Organization acknowledged ST/AI/1999/9 as applicable law for gender balance, confirming its mandatory nature.
The Farrimond (2014) case involved a failure by the Administration to provide the required written analysis under section 1.8(d) of ST/AI/1999/9.
Answer: True
The Farrimond (2014) case concluded that the Administration failed to provide the required written analysis under section 1.8(d) of ST/AI/1999/9, leading to the rescission of the selection decision.
UNAT jurisprudence suggests that the burden of proof in cases of alleged breaches of ST/AI/1999/9 always rests solely on the applicant.
Answer: False
UNAT jurisprudence suggests the burden of proof may be neutral, especially when evidence is held exclusively by the Administration, rather than always resting solely on the applicant.
The Katz (2002) judgement suggests the Secretary-General cannot promote a female candidate under special measures if a male candidate is equally qualified.
Answer: False
The Katz judgement supports the promotion of a substantially equally qualified female candidate under special measures, clarifying that the Secretary-General's discretion allows for this.
The Secretary-General has generally contested the applicability of the Gender AI (ST/AI/1999/9) in tribunal cases.
Answer: False
Tribunal jurisprudence indicates that the Secretary-General has generally not contested, and has sometimes accepted, the applicability of the Gender AI (ST/AI/1999/9) in tribunal cases.
The Farrimond (2014) judgement implies the Administration's obligation to provide written analysis under ST/AI/1999/9 is minimal.
Answer: False
The Farrimond judgement implies a strict obligation for the Administration to provide adequate written analysis under ST/AI/1999/9, not a minimal one.
The phrase 'demonstrable and measurable' in Judgement No. 1302 requires subjective assessment of qualifications.
Answer: False
The phrase 'demonstrable and measurable' requires objective evidence to support claims of superior qualifications, countering subjective assessments.
The Katz (2002) ruling limits the Secretary-General's discretion by preventing any consideration of gender equality goals.
Answer: False
The Katz ruling clarified that the Secretary-General's discretion is not absolute and must consider gender equality goals, as it is governed by the UN Charter and relevant resolutions.
UNAT jurisprudence suggests a 'right to preferential treatment' exists for women under special measures only if they are significantly more qualified than men.
Answer: False
UNAT jurisprudence indicates a right to preferential treatment exists for women candidates whose qualifications are substantially equal to those of male candidates, not necessarily significantly more qualified.
Article 101(3) of the UN Charter allows special measures to override the requirement for the highest standards of staff competence.
Answer: False
Article 101(3) of the UN Charter mandates the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity, a requirement that special measures cannot override.
The UNAT jurisprudence, as seen in Judgement No. 671 (Grinblat), interprets which UN Charter article as supporting affirmative action for women?
Answer: Article 8
The UNAT jurisprudence, notably in Judgement No. 671 (Grinblat), interprets Article 8 of the UN Charter as supporting affirmative action measures to improve the status of women.
What limitation did the UNAT place on affirmative action in the Grinblat judgement concerning Article 101(3) of the UN Charter?
Answer: Affirmative action cannot override the requirement for the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.
The UNAT cautioned in the Grinblat judgement that affirmative action measures cannot override Article 101(3) of the UN Charter, which mandates the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity for staff.
What specific requirement related to written analysis was highlighted in the Farrimond (2014) case concerning ST/AI/1999/9?
Answer: The Administration failed to provide the required written analysis under section 1.8(d).
The Farrimond (2014) case highlighted that the Administration failed to provide the required written analysis under section 1.8(d) of ST/AI/1999/9, which was a critical finding.
The UNAT judgement in Katz (2002) clarified that the Secretary-General's appointment discretion is:
Answer: Limited by the UN Charter and relevant resolutions, including special measures.
The Katz (2002) judgement clarified that the Secretary-General's appointment discretion is not absolute but is limited by the UN Charter and relevant resolutions, including those pertaining to special measures for gender equality.
The new staff selection system (ST/AI 2010/3) explicitly supersedes all previous administrative instructions on gender equality.
Answer: False
ST/AI 2010/3 states its provisions prevail over inconsistent ones, leading the Secretariat to sometimes argue it supersedes ST/AI/1999/9, but this interpretation is contested and not an explicit superseding of *all* previous instructions on gender equality.
The UN Secretariat consistently argues that ST/AI 2010/3 fully incorporates and upholds all provisions of the Gender Equality A/I.
Answer: False
The UN Secretariat sometimes argues that ST/AI 2010/3 supersedes provisions of ST/AI 1999/9 due to perceived inconsistencies, a position contested by UN Women.
What is the contested interpretation regarding ST/AI 2010/3 and the Gender Equality A/I (ST/AI/1999/9)?
Answer: The UN Secretariat sometimes argues ST/AI 2010/3 supersedes ST/AI/1999/9 due to perceived inconsistencies.
A contested interpretation is that ST/AI 2010/3, due to its prevailing provisions, supersedes ST/AI/1999/9, a stance often argued by the UN Secretariat but not universally accepted.