What was the primary objective of the Second Battle of Changsha?

The Second Battle of Changsha, which took place from September 6 to October 8, 1941, was Japan's second attempt to capture the city of Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province in China, as part of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

What was the result of the Second Battle of Changsha?

Both sides, the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, claimed victory in the Second Battle of Changsha, and there was no territorial change as a result of the conflict.

Who were the main commanders for the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan during the Second Battle of Changsha?

The commander for the Republic of China was Xue Yue, while the commander for the Empire of Japan was Korechika Anami.

What were the military units involved in the Second Battle of Changsha?

The Republic of China Army was involved on the Chinese side, while the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy participated on the Japanese side.

What was the troop strength of the Chinese forces in the Changsha battlefield?

In the Changsha battlefield, the Chinese forces comprised 300,000 troops organized into 30 divisions, supported by 631 artillery pieces.

What was the troop strength of the Japanese forces in the Changsha battlefield?

In the Changsha battlefield, the Japanese forces consisted of 120,000 troops organized into 46 battalions, supported by 326 artillery pieces.

What were the total casualties and losses reported by the Chinese Ninth Military Front?

The Chinese Ninth Military Front reported 23,858 killed, 35,220 wounded, and 11,594 missing, totaling 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing. They also claimed 55,821 Japanese troops killed or wounded and 263 Japanese troops captured.

What were the total casualties and losses reported by the Chinese Sixth Military Front in supporting operations?

The Chinese Sixth Military Front in the Yichang offensive suffered 21,368 casualties. They claimed 6,422 Japanese soldiers killed or wounded and 23 Japanese soldiers captured.

What were the total casualties and losses reported by the Japanese army?

The Japanese 11th army reported 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing across the Changsha, Yichang, Jiangnan, and Haoxue battlefields. They claimed the Chinese army left behind 54,000 corpses and 4,300 prisoners.

What international events influenced Japan's decision to launch the Changsha operation?

Japan's decision to launch the Changsha operation was influenced by the US Congress passing a 100-million-dollar loan to China and Britain approving a 10-million-pound loan to China. These moves were in response to Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact and its recognition of Wang Jingwei's puppet government.

What was the Japanese army's 'Long-term Operational Guidance Plan for China' adopted in January 1941?

The 'Long-term Operational Guidance Plan for China' adopted by the Japanese army on January 16, 1941, stipulated that they would not ease pressure on China but would launch aggressive operations in the summer and autumn of 1941, while considering the international situation and clearing occupied areas.

How did Operation Barbarossa affect the Japanese preparation for the Changsha operation?

Operation Barbarossa, which began on June 22, 1941, disrupted the preparation for the Changsha operation because the China Expeditionary Army considered redeploying units of the 11th army in anticipation of a war with the Soviet Union.

How did the Chinese army prepare for the Japanese offensive, particularly regarding the Kwantung Army's build-up?

The Chinese army was aware of the Kwantung Army's build-up in Northeast China, which was a contingency for a war with the Soviet Union. They detected General Anami gathering four divisions, totaling 120,000 troops, for an invasion in Hunan.

Describe the initial Japanese offensive around Dayun Mountain.

On September 7, the Japanese 6th division, with air support, launched a mopping-up operation at Dayun Mountain. Chinese positions at Yanling and Jianshan fell, trapping defending regiments. Chinese forces, including the 27th army group, were ordered to assist, leading to fierce fighting for the mountain over the next two days.

What mistake did the Japanese 6th division make regarding Dayun Mountain, and what was the consequence?

The Japanese 6th division mistakenly reported that Dayun Mountain had been cleared of enemy troops to the Shigematsu task force of the 40th division. As a result, the task force was unprepared for a counterattack by the Chinese 59th, 60th, and new 10th divisions, leading to the Chinese recapture of the mountain peak.

What was the outcome of the fighting around Dayun Mountain for the Japanese 40th division?

The Japanese 40th division struggled under the Chinese counterattack and, after a week of fierce fighting from September 14 to 17, suffered losses exceeding half of its engaged units.

When did the Japanese army launch their all-out offensive, and what was the immediate Chinese response?

The Japanese army launched their all-out offensive on September 18. The 6th division forced a crossing at the Xinqiang River, breaking through the 4th corps' position. In response, Yang Sen ordered the 133rd and 134th divisions of the 20th corps and the 58th corps to block the enemy near Yanglin street.

How did the battle progress at the Miluo River from September 19 to 25?

From September 19 to 24, Japanese 3rd, 4th, and 6th divisions crossed the Miluo River and attacked Chinese 37th and 99th corps, which had not fully deployed. Fierce fighting ensued, and Chinese positions were breached, forcing the two corps to retreat by September 25.

What happened to the Chinese 26th corps during the all-out offensive?

The Chinese 26th corps clashed with the Japanese 6th division, which quickly broke through its flanks and encircled the unit by September 23. The corps was ordered to break out on September 25, with remnants retreating to Genggutai and Shiwan.

What was the fate of the Chinese 10th corps during the all-out offensive?

The Chinese 10th corps was ordered to occupy the Jinjing-Suqiao line on September 22 but was besieged by Japanese 3rd, 4th, and 6th divisions and the Hayabuchi task force on September 24. Its defensive positions were breached by September 26, and it suffered heavy casualties, including the wounding of divisional commander Zhu Yue and the killing of deputy divisional commander Lai Chuanxiang.

What was the significance of the failure of Xue Yue's plan during the all-out offensive?

By the time the 10th corps' defensive positions were breached and it suffered heavy casualties, Xue Yue's original plan to destroy the Japanese army at the south bank of the Miluo River had failed.

Why was the Chinese 74th corps a significant concern for the Japanese 11th army?

The Japanese 11th army regarded the 74th corps, commanded by Wang Yaowu, as an elite assault corps directly under the Nationalist Government, having fought in several battles against the 11th army. Its movement to the battlefield, detected through intercepted telegraphs, significantly affected Japanese operational plans.

How did the Japanese 11th army decide to deal with the Chinese 74th corps?

During a combat meeting on September 24, General Anami decided to focus on the original objective of advancing towards Changsha with the 3rd and 4th divisions, while tasking the 6th division with defeating the 74th corps at the Laodao River.

Describe the initial engagement between Japanese and Chinese forces at Chunhua Mountain on September 26.

On the early morning of September 26, a Japanese battalion of the 3rd division, attempting to secure a crossing point for the Liuyang River, encountered units of the Chinese 74th corps at Chunhua Mountain. The Japanese battalion commander mistakenly thought they were defeated stragglers, leading to a fierce and prolonged battle throughout the day.

How did the Chinese 74th corps manage to surprise the Japanese at Chunhua Mountain?

The Chinese 74th corps moved faster than the Japanese 11th army had anticipated, accustomed to rapid night marches to avoid Japanese aircraft. On the afternoon of September 25, its 57th division was ordered to seize front-line positions at Chunhua Mountain, leading to an early morning encounter with the Japanese vanguard on September 26.

What was the intensity of the fighting at Yong'an city on September 27?

At 2 a.m. on September 27, brutal hand-to-hand combat occurred at the burning city of Yong'an, with grenades thrown everywhere. The Japanese 18th infantry regiment suffered heavy losses, including two company commanders killed, and its assault on the highland was halted.

What were the casualties for the Japanese 29th infantry brigade during the Second Battle of Changsha?

According to General Anami's diary, the 29th infantry brigade of the Japanese 3rd division suffered over 800 casualties during the entire Second Battle of Changsha, with the 18th infantry regiment alone losing 8 company commanders, mostly in battles near Chunhua Mountain and Yong'an city.

What was the impact of the battle on the Chinese 58th division?

The Chinese 58th division faced intense pressure from both the Japanese 3rd and 6th divisions, particularly at Chunhua Mountain. It lost two battalion commanders, Yu Guanying (killed) and Guo Runchu (wounded), and all battalion and company commanders of the 173rd regiment were killed or wounded, indicating a bitter battle across all its regiments.

What was Chiang Kai-Shek's directive to the Ninth Military Front on September 27?

On the morning of September 27, Chiang Kai-Shek sent a telegraph to the Ninth Military Front, stating that the Laodao River operation was crucial for defending Changsha and the nation's survival. He ordered that anyone failing to obey orders, hesitating to advance, or retreating without authorization would be summarily executed.

How did Xue Yue's plan change after the Chinese forces were pinned down at Laodao River?

At 5 p.m. on September 27, Wang Yaowu received a telegraph from Xue Yue, indicating a new plan to lure the enemy deeper into Chinese territory and engage them north of the Liuyang River. Wang Yaowu was ordered to lead his corps to Dongyang City under the cover of night.

When did Japanese forces enter Changsha City?

On September 27, the Japanese 4th division crossed the Liuyang River, clashed with the Chinese 98th division, and entered the northeast corner of Changsha City at 5 p.m. The Hayabuchi task force entered Changsha at 10 p.m. on the same day.

What was the Japanese 3rd division's unauthorized action after their victory against the 74th corps?

After their victory against the 74th corps, some units of the Japanese 3rd division rushed south to capture Zhuzhou without orders. General Anami eventually approved this action, and the 3rd division occupied Zhuzhou on September 29 after two days of fighting with the temporary 8th division.

When did the Japanese 11th army begin its withdrawal from Changsha, and why?

The Japanese 11th army began its withdrawal from Changsha on October 1, believing they had defeated the core units of the Ninth Military Front (74th, 37th, 26th, and 10th corps). The withdrawal was also influenced by the shortening of the operation period, which did not allow them to remain in the city for long.

How did the Chinese forces respond to the Japanese withdrawal from Changsha?

Detecting the beginning of the withdrawal, Xue Yue ordered his troops to aggressively pursue, flank, and harass the retreating Japanese army. This led to ambushes, such as the one on the Hayabuchi task force by the 98th division, resulting in casualties for the Japanese.

What were the initial actions of the Chinese forces on the Jingmen-Shashi Front during the Yichang Offensive?

On September 28, Chinese units, including the 348th regiment, 390th regiment, and Dongting Lake guerilla detachment, crossed the Yangtze River and advanced towards Bailuoji. Other divisions also crossed the river near Haoxue, and by September 29, the 15th division had destroyed parts of the Han-Yi highway and four bridges.

What impact did Chinese sabotage efforts have on Japanese communications during the Yichang Offensive?

Chinese sabotage efforts, including the destruction of bridges and communication facilities by the 33rd and 20th army groups, resulted in many communication lines being severed and paralyzed the command and communication functions of the Japanese 103rd brigade at Yaqueling.

Describe the Chinese army's tenacity at Moji Mountain on the Yixi Front.

On September 28, Chinese divisions assaulted the Japanese position at Moji Mountain. The Japanese side recorded an instance where dozens of Chinese soldiers broke into their position and committed suicide with grenades when surrounded, demonstrating the Chinese army's tenacious assaults despite being unable to capture the area.

What notable event occurred at Shuanglian Temple during the Yichang Offensive?

On the early morning of September 30, a portion of the Chinese 75th corps attacked Shuanglian Temple by surprise, burning down some Japanese barracks. Later, Yoshikawa's 10th company attempted to rescue the besieged garrison at Xianren Fort, suffering 10 killed and 66 wounded, including Lieutenant Yoshikawa, before retreating to Shuanglian Temple, and Xianren Fort was captured by the Chinese.

What challenges did the Japanese 13th division face during the Chinese attack towards Yichang?

By October 4, the Japanese 13th division was suffering continuous casualties and was overstretched in its defense lines. It had to organize a temporary garrison unit of 388 non-combat troops and lightly wounded soldiers from its headquarters to defend Yichang.

How did an entertainment troupe from Tokyo contribute to the defense of Yichang?

An entertainment troupe from Asakusa, Tokyo, arrived to comfort the Japanese troops in Yichang. Initially, they cared for the wounded and sick, but witnessing the horrific injuries, they were eventually given weapons to help defend the city.

Describe the fighting at Dongshan Temple in Yichang.

On October 6, the Chinese 9th division attacked Dongshan Temple, engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the Japanese garrison. Fierce fighting continued all day and night, with the Japanese artillery commander, Zentaro Suzuki, even ordering artillery to fire at the rear of the Chinese army to avoid hitting his own men.

What was the outcome of the Chinese general offensive on October 10, the Double Tenth Day?

On October 10, the Chinese army launched a general offensive around Yichang, leading to bloody fighting on all fronts. Despite breaking through Japanese defenses in Yichang, the Chinese assault troops were forced to retreat after the Japanese used poison gas, resulting in over 500 Chinese casualties from the gas.

What was the Japanese command's reaction to the intense Chinese pressure during the Yichang Offensive?

Under serious pressure, Lieutenant General Uchiyama Eitaro ordered his chief of staff, Akinaga, to burn confidential documents and prepare a place for the divisional commander and his staff to commit suicide. Lieutenant General Anami then ordered an offensive to rescue the 13th division.

Why did the Chinese army halt its Yichang offensive?

The Chinese army's offensive was frustrated by muddy terrain due to heavy rain. Coupled with reports of Japanese reinforcements and Chen Cheng's report of poison gas use, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered a stop to the offensive on October 11.

What was the Chinese army's overall assessment of the Japanese military's performance in the battle?

The Chinese army assessed that the Japanese army displayed great speed and courage in both attack and withdrawal, advancing 130 kilometers in 11 days like a Blitzkrieg and retreating 12 kilometers a day, which caught the Chinese off-guard. They also noted the Japanese army's excellent combined arms, training, and commando tactics.

What were the specific casualty figures for the Chinese elite corps in the Ninth Military Front?

The Chinese 10th corps suffered 8,768 casualties, the 4th corps suffered 10,373 casualties, the 37th corps suffered 14,015 casualties, and the 74th corps, a main target, suffered 14,521 casualties. The 58th division alone lost 6,192 out of 11,907 troops, nearly all its combat personnel.

How did Chiang Kai-Shek criticize Xue Yue and his generals after the fall of Changsha?

Chiang Kai-Shek criticized Xue Yue for withdrawing his headquarters without authorization, allowing the enemy to enter Changsha. He also reprimanded his generals for their 'outdated thinking' of defending outlying fortifications while leaving central points weak, and for their indecisiveness, cowardice, and inability to capture prisoners or weapons.

What was the Japanese 11th army's view on the success and impact of the Changsha operation?

The Japanese 11th army considered their operational objective successful after defeating the 74th corps, despite only causing limited damage to the Chinese army. They noted that units entered Changsha but were not allowed to remain long due to the shortened operation period. The Chinese counterattack at Yichang also demonstrated high morale and a grand scale of operation.

Battle Of Changsha 1941 Wiki: Echoes of Hunan: The Pivotal 1941 Battle for Changsha

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Battle Overview

Dates and Location

The Second Battle of Changsha unfolded from September 6 to October 8, 1941, spanning just over a month. This significant engagement took place in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, Republic of China. It represented Japan's second major attempt to capture this strategically vital city during the protracted Second Sino-Japanese War.

Belligerents and Commanders

The conflict pitted the forces of the Republic of China Army against the combined might of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy. On the Chinese side, General Xue Yue led the defense, while Lieutenant General Korechika Anami commanded the Japanese offensive.

Disputed Outcome

The battle concluded with both sides claiming victory, yet no significant territorial changes occurred. This ambiguous result underscores the intense and often indecisive nature of the larger Sino-Japanese conflict, where strategic objectives frequently clashed with tactical realities.

Strategic Prelude

Japanese Preparations

In late 1940, international support for China intensified, with the U.S. providing a $100 million loan and Britain approving a £10 million loan. This was a direct response to Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact and its recognition of Wang Jingwei's puppet government. In light of this, the Japanese military adopted a "Long-term Operational Guidance Plan for China" in January 1941, aiming to resolve the 'China Incident' swiftly through aggressive operations in the summer and autumn, while also considering the broader international situation.

Lieutenant General Korechika Anami assumed command of the 11th Army in April 1941, initiating preparations for the Changsha offensive. Despite the launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, which prompted the China Expeditionary Army to consider redeploying units for a potential war with the Soviet Union, General Anami approved the Changsha Operation outline on June 24, targeting a September 15 offensive.

The primary objective was explicitly stated as "to deal a major blow to the Ninth Military Front in order to thwart the enemy's plan for resistance," rather than territorial occupation or supply acquisition. Japanese intelligence estimated the Chinese forces at fifteen divisions. To counter this, the Japanese committed 41 infantry battalions across four divisions and three task forces, supported by 29 artillery battalions, anticipating a potential increase in Chinese numbers.

Chinese Preparations

The Chinese military was acutely aware of the Kwantung Army's build-up in Northeast China, anticipating a conflict with the Soviet Union. They detected General Anami's concentration of four divisions, totaling 120,000 troops, for an invasion of Hunan. Following the Battle of Shanggao in March 1941, the Ninth Military Front had already instructed its troops to collaborate with guerilla forces in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border region to harass the enemy and prepare for an offensive.

A substantial force of 35 divisions, organized into 13 armies across three army groups, totaling 378,307 troops, was assembled in Hunan, with the Ninth Military Front's headquarters centered in Changsha. By August 1941, the Ninth Military Front concluded that the Japanese objective was to capture Changsha and secure supplies. Their strategic counter-plan was to lure the Japanese army south of the Miluo River, intending to encircle and annihilate them there.

Changsha Engagements

Dayun Mountain Skirmishes

On September 7, the Japanese 6th Division, supported by air power, initiated a "mopping-up" operation at Dayun Mountain. Chinese defenders, including elements of the 59th, 102nd, and New 11th Divisions, found themselves in a desperate struggle as key positions fell. General Yang Sen, commander of the 27th Army Group, ordered reinforcements, leading to fierce fighting for the mountain over the next two days.

On September 10, the Japanese Shigematsu task force (40th Division) arrived, mistakenly believing Dayun Mountain was cleared. They were caught off guard by a Chinese counterattack from the 59th, 60th, and New 10th Divisions, leading to heavy Japanese losses and the recapture of the mountain peak by Chinese forces. The Japanese 11th Army headquarters dispatched the Araki task force (33rd Division) as reinforcement. After a week of intense combat, the Japanese 40th Division suffered over 50% casualties. Recognizing the Japanese build-up, the Chinese 27th Army Group gradually withdrew from Dayun Mountain on September 17-18, incurring over 3,000 casualties.

River Crossings and Breaches

The Japanese launched their full offensive on September 18. The 6th Division breached the Xinqiang River defenses, forcing the Chinese 4th Corps to retreat. The entire 11th Army then crossed the river. Chinese forces, including the 20th and 58th Corps, attempted to block the Japanese advance near Yanglin Street. On September 19, the Japanese 40th Division faced fierce resistance from the Chinese 59th and 90th Divisions, resulting in heavy losses for both sides.

From September 19 to 24, Japanese 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions crossed the Miluo River, engaging the Chinese 37th and 99th Corps. Chinese positions were progressively breached, leading to a retreat by September 25. Simultaneously, the Japanese 6th Division encircled the Chinese 26th Corps, which was forced to break out and retreat with significant losses. By September 26, the Chinese 10th Corps' defensive positions at Jinjing-Suqiao were breached, suffering heavy casualties during their retreat. At this point, General Xue Yue's initial plan to destroy the Japanese south of the Miluo River had failed.

Laodao River Carnage

The Japanese 11th Army closely monitored the elite Chinese 74th Corps, whose movements were intercepted via telegraph. On September 24, General Anami decided the 6th Division would block the 74th Corps at the Laodao River, while the 3rd and 4th Divisions continued towards Changsha. On September 26, a Japanese vanguard (3rd Division) unexpectedly encountered the 74th Corps at Chunhua Mountain, leading to intense and prolonged combat.

The 74th Corps, having executed rapid night marches, surprised the Japanese. The 57th and 58th Divisions secured key positions at Chunhua Mountain. Fierce assaults and counterattacks ensued, with the Japanese 3rd Division's 18th Infantry Regiment suffering severe losses, including eight company commanders. The 58th Division also faced immense pressure, losing two battalion commanders and suffering heavy casualties across its regiments. The 57th Division sustained nearly 3,000 casualties. On September 27, Chiang Kai-Shek issued a stern order, emphasizing the critical importance of the Laodao River defense. Despite this, the 74th Corps, pinned down by three Japanese divisions, was ordered to withdraw under cover of night. The 58th Division, covering the retreat, endured particularly heavy losses.

Changsha's Brief Fall

Recognizing the rapid Japanese advance towards an undefended Changsha, Xue Yue ordered the 98th Division (79th Corps) and the Temporary 8th Division (Temporary 2nd Corps) to garrison the city. On September 27, the Japanese 4th Division entered Changsha, followed by the Hayabuchi task force. Without orders, some units of the 3rd Division pushed south to capture Zhuzhou, which General Anami later approved. By September 29, Zhuzhou was occupied.

On September 30, the Chinese Temporary 6th Division (79th Corps) engaged the Japanese 4th Division within Changsha. Believing they had crippled the Ninth Military Front's core units, the Japanese 11th Army began withdrawing from Changsha on October 1, with only the Hirano task force remaining to engage the Chinese 99th Corps. Xue Yue ordered an aggressive pursuit, flanking and harassing the retreating Japanese. The Hayabuchi task force was ambushed at the Laodao River, losing two battalion commanders. A Japanese company was encircled and required air support for rescue. By October 6, the Japanese withdrawal was complete, and the battlefield returned to its pre-battle state.

Yichang Offensive

Diversionary Attack

Upon learning of the Japanese crossing the Xinqiang River on September 18, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Sixth Military Front to launch an offensive to recapture Yichang. The 20th and 33rd Army Groups were tasked with sabotaging the Han-Yi highway, while the River Defense Army attacked Yichang, supported by the 26th Army Group. Offensives began on September 28.

Initial Chinese Pressure

On September 28, Chinese units, including the 116th and 130th Divisions, crossed the Yangtze River, advancing towards Bailuoji. Other forces crossed near Haoxue, destroying parts of the Han-Yi highway and bridges. The 59th, 77th, and 39th Corps attacked Japanese garrison positions and disrupted communication lines. These sabotage efforts severely hampered the Japanese 13th Division's command and communication capabilities at Yaqueling.

Fierce Frontal Assaults

Chinese forces launched tenacious assaults across multiple fronts. At Moji Mountain, the 94th Corps engaged the Japanese 58th Infantry Regiment in fierce combat, with Chinese soldiers reportedly committing suicide with grenades rather than being captured. At Longquanpu, a Japanese battalion was besieged by the 75th Corps, leading to a prolonged standoff. The 75th Corps also attacked Shuanglian Temple, burning barracks and capturing positions, resulting in significant Japanese casualties.

Yichang Under Siege

By October 4, the Japanese 13th Division defending Yichang was severely overstretched, resorting to forming a temporary garrison unit from non-combat and lightly wounded troops. An entertainment troupe from Tokyo, present to comfort the troops, was even armed for defense. On October 6, the Chinese 9th Division attacked Fengziling and pursued the retreating Japanese to Dongshan Temple in Yichang's eastern suburb, initiating intense hand-to-hand combat.

The 9th Division continued its relentless assaults on Dongshan Temple, engaging in a five-hour grenade battle on October 7. On October 8, they captured Yandunbao and Dongyue Temple, pushing into Yichang's eastern suburbs. A Chinese ranger team from the 185th Division (94th Corps) even landed at Gezhouba, shocking the Japanese 13th Division. Japanese reinforcements, including Suzuki's battalion, were dispatched but faced stubborn Chinese resistance en route. The 77th Division (73rd Corps) exploited the vulnerability at Yaqueling, engaging the 103rd Brigade in bitter fighting.

On October 10, "Double Tenth Day," the Chinese launched a general offensive around Yichang. The 2nd Corps unleashed unprecedented artillery fire on Dongshan Temple, with the 9th Division breaking through defenses three times and engaging in street fighting within Yichang. During these assaults, the Japanese reportedly used poison gas, causing over 500 Chinese casualties. Facing imminent collapse, the Japanese 13th Division's staff prepared for suicide, prompting General Anami to order a desperate relief offensive. However, heavy rain and reports of Japanese reinforcements led Chen Cheng to order a Chinese retreat on October 11, ending the Yichang offensive.

Battle Outcome

Chinese Perspective

The Chinese Ninth Military Front reported 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing, while claiming 55,821 Japanese killed or wounded and 263 captured. The Sixth Military Front in the Yichang offensive suffered 21,368 casualties, claiming 6,422 Japanese killed or wounded and 23 captured. The Chinese acknowledged the Japanese army's remarkable speed, courage, combined arms proficiency, and commando tactics, noting their own failure to annihilate the Japanese at the Miluo River and a significant lack of artillery firepower.

Despite the heavy losses, the Chinese believed they inflicted significant casualties on the enemy and captured substantial spoils. They also emphasized the positive impact on international opinion and Chinese morale. However, the battle severely impacted elite Chinese units: the 10th Corps suffered 8,768 casualties, the 4th Corps 10,373, the 37th Corps 14,015, and the 74th Corps, the primary target, 14,521. The 58th Division, in particular, lost nearly all its combat troops, with 6,192 casualties out of 11,907.

Chiang Kai-Shek heavily criticized General Xue Yue for the fall of Changsha, citing unauthorized withdrawal and a general "cowardice" among commanders. He lamented the outdated defensive mindset and the inability to effectively pursue or capture enemy soldiers, calling it a "great disgrace" and a sign of regression in military capabilities.

Japanese Perspective

The Japanese 11th Army reported 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing across all battlefields, including 1,212 killed and 3,760 wounded in the Changsha sector, and 401 killed and 1,256 wounded in the Yichang counter-offensive. They claimed to have left behind 54,000 Chinese corpses and captured 4,300 prisoners. The 65th Infantry Regiment of the 13th Division suffered particularly heavy casualties, with 213 killed in action according to post-war military histories, though actual combat losses were likely higher.

The Japanese viewed the Changsha operation as a success in achieving its primary objective of striking a blow against the Ninth Military Front, despite the limited duration of their occupation of Changsha. However, they acknowledged the high morale and large scale of the Chinese counterattack at Yichang. General Anami was reportedly dissatisfied by internal comments suggesting the battle primarily served Chinese propaganda, which influenced his decision to approve another Changsha offensive (the Third Battle of Changsha) on short notice, leading to subsequent Japanese defeats.

Comparative Casualties

The disparity in reported casualties highlights the differing perspectives and methodologies of war reporting during the conflict. Below is a summary of the claimed losses:

Force	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total Casualties	Claimed Enemy Killed/Wounded	Claimed Enemy Captured
Chinese Ninth Military Front	23,858	35,220	11,594	70,672	55,821	263
Chinese Third Military Front (Supporting)	1,600+ (losses) / 5,678 (K/W)	-	741	-	6,294 / 6,541	224 / 313
Chinese Fifth Military Front (Supporting)	-	-	-	790	~1,200	371
Chinese Sixth Military Front (Yichang)	-	-	-	21,368	6,422	23
Total Chinese (approx.)	-	-	-	~100,000	-	-
Japanese 11th Army (Official Data)	1,670	5,184	14	6,868	54,000 (corpses)	4,300

Note: Chinese figures for "killed or wounded" often include missing personnel. Japanese "killed" figures are typically lower than Chinese claims.

Post-Battle Aftermath

Command Accountability

In the Third Nanyue military conference (October 16-21, 1941), Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the execution of Liao Lingqi, commander of the 58th Division, for desertion. Liao vehemently protested his innocence, leading to his detention and swift execution on October 22. His death sparked outrage among his troops, with several regimental commanders resigning in protest.

After reading Liao Lingqi's final notes and witnessing the widespread protest from the 58th Division, Chiang Kai-Shek posthumously rehabilitated him, granting his family an annual pension and enshrining his body in the Nanyue Martyrs Shrine. Zhang Lingfu was promoted to divisional commander of the 58th Division, which underwent a three-month reorganization and was specifically excluded from participating in the subsequent Third Battle of Changsha.

Leadership Changes

Li Yutang, commander of the 10th Corps, was initially dismissed following the battle. However, the rapid onset of the Third Battle of Changsha necessitated his reinstatement, where he played a crucial role in defending the urban center.

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References

Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record 1937-1941 pp. 265

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 36-37.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 202.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 235-236.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 283-284.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 349-351.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 355-357.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 376-380.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 1-8.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 37-51.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 392-399.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 61-76.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 79-93.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 95-103.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 400-437.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 437-442.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 446-447.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 106-108.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 447-449.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 451-452.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 455-456.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 462.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 108-109.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 452-453.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 111.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 109.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 112.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 18.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 112-116.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 462-463.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 2) 1966, p. 117-125.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 468-473.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 473-477.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 237.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 242.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 248-250.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 254-262.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 261.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 499.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 264.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 251-252.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 500-501.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 254.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 492-493.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 493-495.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 506.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 265.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 497-499.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 258.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 262-265.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 270.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 495-496.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 502.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 506-507.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 273.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 275.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 508-509.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 513.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 499-500.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 277.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 514-515.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 515-517.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 278-281.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 496.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 280.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 517-522.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 281.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 525.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 281-283.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 278.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 282.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 526.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 526-527.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 3) 1966, p. 293-295.

History of the Anti-Japanese War: Second Battle of Changsha (Part 1) 1966, p. 3.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 529-530.

Senshi SÅsho Volume 47 : Hong Kong and Changsha Operations 1971, p. 546-547.

A full list of references for this article are available at the Battle of Changsha (1941) Wikipedia page

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Echoes of Hunan: The Pivotal 1941 Battle for Changsha

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Battle Overview 🗺️

🗓️ Dates and Location

🤝 Belligerents and Commanders

⚖️ Disputed Outcome

Strategic Prelude 📜

🇯🇵 Japanese Preparations

🇨🇳 Chinese Preparations

Changsha Engagements 💥

⛰️ Dayun Mountain Skirmishes

🌊 River Crossings and Breaches

🩸 Laodao River Carnage

🏙️ Changsha's Brief Fall

Yichang Offensive ⚔️

🎯 Diversionary Attack

🚧 Initial Chinese Pressure

🔥 Fierce Frontal Assaults

⚠️ Yichang Under Siege

Battle Outcome 📊

🇨🇳 Chinese Perspective

🇯🇵 Japanese Perspective

📉 Comparative Casualties

Post-Battle Aftermath 🩹

⚖️ Command Accountability

🔄 Leadership Changes

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📜 References

Feedback & Support 👍

To report an issue with this page, or to find out ways to support the mission, please click here.

Disclaimer ⚠️

📜 Important Notice

Dive in with Flashcard Learning!

Battle Overview

Dates and Location

Belligerents and Commanders

Disputed Outcome

Strategic Prelude

Japanese Preparations

Chinese Preparations

Changsha Engagements

Dayun Mountain Skirmishes

River Crossings and Breaches

Laodao River Carnage

Changsha's Brief Fall

Yichang Offensive

Diversionary Attack

Initial Chinese Pressure

Fierce Frontal Assaults

Yichang Under Siege

Battle Outcome

Chinese Perspective

Japanese Perspective

Comparative Casualties

Post-Battle Aftermath

Command Accountability

Leadership Changes

Teacher's Corner

True or False?

Test Your Knowledge!

Gamer's Corner

Discover other topics to study!

References

Feedback & Support

Disclaimer

Important Notice