What was the formal name of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

The formal name of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This lengthy title clearly outlined the primary objective of the agreement between the two superpowers.

What type of treaty was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty classified as?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was classified as a nuclear disarmament treaty. This means it was an agreement aimed at reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons, specifically certain categories of missiles, to enhance global security.

When and where was the INF Treaty signed?

The INF Treaty was signed on 8 December 1987, at 1:45 p.m., at the White House in Washington, D.C., United States. This historic event marked a significant moment in arms control during the Cold War.

Who were the key signatories of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

The key signatories of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty were Mikhail Gorbachev, representing the Soviet Union, and Ronald Reagan, representing the United States. Their signing of the treaty was a landmark achievement in reducing nuclear tensions.

When did the INF Treaty become effective, and what condition was required for its effectiveness?

The INF Treaty became effective on 1 June 1988. Its effectiveness was conditional upon ratification by both the Soviet Union and the United States, a standard procedure for international agreements to ensure they are legally binding.

What specific categories of missiles and launchers did the INF Treaty prohibit?

The INF Treaty prohibited all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges of 1,000–5,500 kilometers (intermediate-range) and 500–1,000 kilometers (shorter-range). This comprehensive ban aimed to eliminate a specific class of weapons that posed a significant threat to Europe.

Which types of missiles were not covered by the INF Treaty's prohibitions?

The INF Treaty did not apply to air- or sea-launched missiles. Its scope was specifically limited to ground-launched systems, leaving other delivery platforms for nuclear weapons outside its restrictions.

How many missiles were eliminated by the United States and the Soviet Union by May 1991 under the INF Treaty?

By May 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated a total of 2,692 missiles under the INF Treaty. This significant reduction in weaponry was a tangible outcome of the arms control agreement.

What was the primary reason cited by President Donald Trump for the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty?

President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty on 20 October 2018, primarily citing Russian non-compliance. Specifically, the US claimed Russia had breached the treaty by developing and deploying the intermediate-range cruise missile known as the SSC-8 (Novator 9M729).

What additional reason did the Trump administration provide for withdrawing from the INF Treaty, besides Russian non-compliance?

The Trump administration also claimed that another reason for the withdrawal was to counter a Chinese arms buildup in the Pacific, particularly within the South China Sea, as China was not a signatory to the treaty. This highlighted concerns about a growing missile threat from a non-party to the agreement.

When did the United States formally suspend and then withdraw from the INF Treaty?

The United States formally suspended the INF Treaty on 1 February 2019, and then formally withdrew from it on 2 August 2019. This marked the official end of US participation in the landmark arms control agreement.

What was the Soviet Union's initial deployment that prompted the Western response leading to the INF Treaty?

In March 1976, the Soviet Union first deployed the RSD-10 Pioneer, known as the SS-20 Saber in the West, in its European territories. This mobile, concealable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) carried three nuclear warheads and had a range capable of reaching Western Europe.

How did the SS-20 Saber differ from its predecessors, the SS-4 Sandal and SS-5 Skean, in terms of threat perception?

The SS-20 Saber was perceived as a potentially offensive system, unlike the aging SS-4 Sandal and SS-5 Skean, which were seen as defensive weapons. The SS-20 offered significant improvements in accuracy, mobility, greater range, and multiple warheads, making it a much more formidable threat to Western Europe.

What was the initial stance of the United States under President Jimmy Carter regarding the SS-20 deployment?

Initially, the United States under President Jimmy Carter considered its strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft to be sufficient counters to the SS-20 and an adequate deterrent against Soviet aggression. This meant they did not immediately see a need for a new class of weapons to specifically address the SS-20.

Who was Helmut Schmidt, and what role did he play in prompting a Western response to the SS-20?

Helmut Schmidt was the Chancellor of West Germany. In 1977, he argued in a speech that a Western response to the SS-20 deployment should be explored, a call that was echoed by NATO due to a perceived Western disadvantage in European nuclear forces. His intervention pressured the US to develop a counter-strategy.

What was the NATO Double-Track Decision, and when was it made?

The NATO Double-Track Decision was made on 12 December 1979, by Western foreign and defense ministers meeting in Brussels. It was a policy that involved both pursuing bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit theater nuclear forces and, if negotiations failed, modernizing NATO's own intermediate-range nuclear forces.

What were the two main policy 'tracks' of the NATO Double-Track Decision?

The two main policy 'tracks' of the NATO Double-Track Decision were, first, to remove 1,000 of the 7,400 theater nuclear warheads from Europe and pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit theater nuclear forces. Second, if these negotiations failed, NATO would modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) by deploying Pershing II launchers and BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in Europe.

What US missiles were planned for deployment in Europe as part of the NATO Double-Track Decision's modernization track?

As part of the NATO Double-Track Decision's modernization track, the US planned to replace its Pershing 1a missiles with 108 Pershing II launchers in West Germany and deploy 464 BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, beginning in December 1983. These deployments were intended to counter the Soviet SS-20 missiles.

When and where did the preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks begin?

The preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks began in Geneva, Switzerland, in October 1980. These initial discussions took place amidst strained relations due to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which had led to US sanctions against the USSR.

Who led the US and Soviet delegations when formal INF talks began in November 1981?

When formal INF talks began on 30 November 1981, the US negotiators were led by President Ronald Reagan, and the Soviet delegation was led by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. These high-level leaders set the stage for the complex arms control discussions.

What were the core principles of the US negotiating position during the early INF talks?

The core principles of the US negotiating position during the early INF talks were that any limits on US INF capabilities, including 'ceilings' (maximum numbers) and 'rights' (to deploy), must be reciprocated with equivalent limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the US insisted on establishing a sufficient verification regime to ensure compliance.

Who was Paul Nitze, and what was his role in the US delegation for INF negotiations?

Paul Nitze was an experienced politician and long-time presidential advisor on defense policy, who led the US delegation after being recruited by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Nitze had a background in arms control, having participated in the SALT talks, and was known for his anti-Soviet stance as a member of the Committee on the Present Danger.

What was Ronald Reagan's 'Zero Option' proposal, and when was it made?

Ronald Reagan made the 'Zero Option' or 'zero-zero' proposal on 18 November 1981, shortly before formal talks began. This proposal called for the US to halt its deployment of GLCM and Pershing II systems if the Soviet Union eliminated all of its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. It was a bold diplomatic move aimed at complete elimination of these missile categories.

How was the Zero Option proposal received by the Soviet Union and the European public?

The Soviet Union rejected the Zero Option proposal, arguing that both the US and USSR should retain intermediate-range missiles in Europe. However, the gesture was well received by the European public, who generally favored efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

What was the Soviet counter-proposal to the Zero Option in February 1982?

In February 1982, the Soviet Union countered the Zero Option by proposing that the number of INF missiles and aircraft deployed in Europe by each side be capped at 600 by 1985 and 300 by 1990. This proposal was concerning to the US as it would have forced them to withdraw aircraft and not deploy INF missiles, especially given existing British and French deployments.

Describe the 'walk in the woods' incident during the early INF negotiations.

The 'walk in the woods' was an independent attempt by US negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky in the summer of 1982 to bypass bureaucratic procedures and break the negotiating deadlock in Geneva. They discussed a deal where the US would limit GLCMs and forego Pershing IIs, in exchange for Soviet limits on intermediate-range missile launchers in Europe and Asia. This informal proposal, however, ultimately failed to gain traction in either Washington or Moscow.

What was the outcome of the 'walk in the woods' proposal in Washington and Moscow?

The 'walk in the woods' proposal found little traction in either capital. In the United States, the Office of the Secretary of Defense opposed it because it would allow Soviet missile deployment while blocking American ones. In Moscow, Kvitsinsky's relay of the plan also resulted in its rejection. Consequently, the proposal was never formally introduced into negotiations.

What positive consequence did Paul Nitze identify from the 'walk in the woods' initiative?

Paul Nitze argued that one positive consequence of the 'walk in the woods' was that the Western European public, who had previously doubted American interest in arms control, became convinced that the US was participating in the INF negotiations in good faith. This helped to improve public perception of US commitment to peace.

What event led to the Soviet Union ending INF negotiations in November 1983?

The Soviet Union ended INF negotiations in November 1983 after the first US Pershing II missiles arrived in West Germany. This deployment, part of NATO's Double-Track Decision, was seen by the Soviets as a failure of the negotiation track and a direct threat.

Who played a key role in brokering the restarted negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1986-1987?

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher played a key role in brokering the negotiations between US President Ronald Reagan and new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 to 1987. Her diplomatic efforts helped facilitate the resumption of crucial arms control talks.

What was Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal regarding nuclear weapons in January 1986?

On 15 January 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev announced a Soviet proposal for a ban on all nuclear weapons by 2000, which specifically included INF missiles in Europe. This ambitious proposal aimed for complete nuclear disarmament over a long-term period.

What was the US response to Gorbachev's 1986 proposal for a total nuclear weapons ban?

The United States dismissed Gorbachev's 1986 proposal for a total nuclear weapons ban as a public relations stunt. Instead, the US countered with a proposal for a phased reduction of INF launchers in Europe and Asia, aiming for their complete elimination by 1989, with no constraints on British and French nuclear forces.

What significant agreement was reached at the Reykjavík Summit in October 1986?

At the Reykjavík Summit on 11 and 12 October 1986, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed in principle to remove INF systems from Europe and to establish equal global limits of 100 INF missile warheads. This summit was a crucial step towards the eventual signing of the INF Treaty.

How did West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl contribute to the INF Treaty negotiations in 1987?

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl aided the more detailed negotiations in 1987 by deciding in August to remove the joint US-West German Pershing 1a systems. Initially, Kohl had opposed the total elimination of Pershing missiles, fearing increased vulnerability to Warsaw Pact forces, but his change of stance removed a significant obstacle.

What was the process for destroying existing weapons under the INF Treaty?

Under the INF Treaty, existing weapons had to be destroyed, and a protocol for mutual inspection was agreed upon to ensure compliance. This meant that both parties had to allow on-site verification of the destruction process.

How many missiles were destroyed by the US and the Soviet Union respectively by the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991?

By the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991, the US had destroyed 846 weapons, and the Soviet Union had destroyed 1,846 weapons, totaling 2,692 missiles eliminated. This demonstrated a significant commitment to disarmament from both nations.

List some of the specific US missiles that were destroyed under the INF Treaty.

Under the INF Treaty, the United States destroyed specific missiles including the BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (decommissioned), Pershing 1a (decommissioned), and Pershing II (decommissioned). These were key intermediate-range systems that fell under the treaty's prohibitions.

List some of the specific Soviet missiles that were destroyed under the INF Treaty, using their NATO reporting names.

Under the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed specific missiles, listed by their NATO reporting names, including the SS-4 Sandal (decommissioned), SS-5 Skean (decommissioned), SS-12 Scaleboard (decommissioned), SS-20 Saber (decommissioned), SS-23 Spider (decommissioned), and SSC-X-4 Slingshot. These represented a broad range of Soviet intermediate and shorter-range ground-launched missiles.

What was the US focus regarding arms control after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the United States primarily focused on negotiations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to preserve the START I treaty, which aimed at further decreasing nuclear armament. The immediate preservation of the INF Treaty was not the primary focus because the disarmament of INF missiles had already been completed.

Which post-Soviet states actively entered agreements to continue fulfilling the INF Treaty?

From the six newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that contained INF sites subject to inspection, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine entered agreements to continue the fulfillment of the INF Treaty. Russia, as the official successor state, inherited the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and treaty obligations.

When did on-site inspections for INF missile sites conclude, and what continued afterward?

On-site inspections of INF missile sites continued until May 31, 2001, as stipulated by the 13-year inspection agreement within the treaty. After this period, the United States and Russia continued to share national technical means of verification and notifications to ensure ongoing compliance.

What did Russian President Vladimir Putin state about the INF Treaty in his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech?

In February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in his Munich Security Conference speech that the INF Treaty should be revisited to ensure security, as it only restricted Russia and the US but not other countries. This indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the treaty's limitations on Russia while other nations were unconstrained.

What specific Russian missile did US officials claim violated the INF Treaty in 2008?

According to US officials, Russia violated the INF Treaty in 2008 by testing the SSC-8 cruise missile, which they claimed had a range of 3,000 kilometers. Russia, however, rejected this claim, stating that the SSC-8 had a maximum range of only 480 kilometers, thus falling outside the treaty's prohibited range.

What other Russian missiles were reported in 2013 to be tested in ways that could violate the INF Treaty?

In 2013, it was reported that Russia had tested and planned to continue testing two missiles, the road-mobile SS-25 and the newer RS-26 ICBMs, in ways that could violate the terms of the INF Treaty. These reports further fueled concerns about Russian compliance.

How did NATO respond to US claims of Russian INF Treaty violations in 2018?

In 2018, NATO formally supported the US claims and accused Russia of breaking the INF Treaty. This collective backing from NATO allies underscored the seriousness of the allegations and presented a united front against Russia's actions.

What was Russia's counter-accusation regarding US missile defense systems in Europe as a violation of the INF Treaty?

According to Russian officials and American academic Theodore Postol, the US decision to deploy its missile defense system in Europe was a violation of the INF Treaty. They claimed these systems could be quickly retrofitted with offensive capabilities, which the US and NATO officials, along with academic Jeffrey Lewis, rejected.

What other US military assets did Russian experts claim violated the INF Treaty?

Russian experts also stated that the US usage of target missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-4 Triton, violated the INF Treaty. US officials, however, rejected this accusation, maintaining that these systems did not fall under the treaty's prohibitions.

What was Putin's response to the US declaration of intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty in October 2018?

In response to the US declaration of intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty in October 2018, Putin stated that Russia would not launch first in a nuclear conflict but would 'annihilate' any adversary, essentially re-stating the policy of 'Mutually Assured Destruction'. He also claimed that Russians killed in such a conflict 'will go to heaven as martyrs'.

Why did US officials, even before the Trump administration, express concern about China's role in the context of the INF Treaty?

US officials, extending back to the presidency of Barack Obama, expressed concern about China's ability to operate outside of the INF Treaty, particularly regarding its arms buildup in the Pacific. China was not a signatory, allowing it to develop intermediate-range forces without restriction, which vexed policymakers in Washington.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty Wiki: Echoes of Détente: The INF Treaty's Rise and Fall

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The INF Treaty

A Landmark Agreement

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was a pivotal arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, later succeeded by the Russian Federation. Signed on December 8, 1987, by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, it became effective on June 1, 1988, following ratification by the US Senate. This treaty represented a significant step towards nuclear disarmament during the Cold War era.

Scope of Prohibition

The INF Treaty specifically banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, along with their associated launchers, for both nations, within a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (310–3,420 miles). This prohibition applied to both nuclear and conventional warheads. Crucially, the treaty did not extend to air- or sea-launched missiles, focusing solely on land-based systems that posed a direct threat to European security.

Elimination and Expiration

By May 1991, the treaty had led to the verifiable elimination of 2,692 missiles by both parties, followed by a decade of on-site verification inspections. However, the treaty's lifespan concluded with the US withdrawal on August 2, 2019, citing Russian non-compliance. Russia subsequently announced it would no longer abide by the treaty as of August 4, 2025, marking the end of this historic arms control regime.

Treaty Overview

For a concise summary of the INF Treaty's key parameters, refer to the table below:

Attribute	Detail
Type	Nuclear disarmament
Signed	8 December 1987
Location	White House, Washington, D.C., United States
Effective	1 June 1988
Condition	Ratification by the Soviet Union and United States
Expiration	2 August 2019 (U.S. withdrawal) 4 August 2025 (Russia withdrawal)
Signatories	Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Union), Ronald Reagan (United States)
Parties	Soviet Union, United States
Languages	English and Russian

Historical Background

The SS-20 Catalyst

The genesis of the INF Treaty can be traced to the Soviet Union's deployment of the RSD-10 Pioneer missile (known as SS-20 Saber in the West) in March 1976. This mobile, concealable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) carried three 150-kiloton nuclear warheads, with a range of 4,700–5,000 kilometers. Its advanced capabilities, including greater accuracy and mobility, made it a significant threat to Western Europe, replacing older, less capable systems like the SS-4 Sandal and SS-5 Skean, which were largely seen as defensive.

NATO's Double-Track Decision

Initially, the United States considered its existing strategic nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter the SS-20. However, growing concerns in Europe, particularly voiced by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977, prompted NATO to seek a more direct response. This led to the landmark NATO Double-Track Decision on December 12, 1979. This policy pursued two simultaneous paths:

Negotiation: The US would engage in bilateral talks with the Soviet Union to limit theater nuclear forces.
Modernization: If negotiations failed, NATO would modernize its own intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) by deploying 108 Pershing II launchers in West Germany and 464 BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) across several European nations, beginning in December 1983.

This decision aimed to counter the perceived Western disadvantage in European nuclear forces and pressure the Soviets into arms control talks.

The Negotiation Process

Early Standoffs (1981-1983)

Preliminary INF talks commenced in Geneva in October 1980, amidst strained US-Soviet relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Formal negotiations began on November 30, 1981, with US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev leading their respective delegations. The US, led by Paul Nitze, insisted on reciprocal limits and a robust verification regime. Reagan's "Zero Option" proposal in November 1981, calling for the elimination of all US and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, was popular in Europe but rejected by the Soviets, who sought to retain some missiles while blocking US deployments.

US Zero Option (Nov 1981): US would forgo GLCM and Pershing II deployments if the Soviets eliminated their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles.
Soviet Counter-Proposal (Feb 1982): Cap INF missiles and aircraft in Europe at 600 by 1985 and 300 by 1990, which the US rejected as it would disproportionately affect their forces.
"Walk in the Woods" (Summer 1982): An informal attempt by Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky to break the deadlock, proposing mutual limits on GLCMs and IRBMs. This initiative, though ultimately rejected by both Washington and Moscow, demonstrated a genuine desire for progress and improved public perception of US commitment to arms control.
US Revised Stance (Early 1983): Signaled willingness to move beyond the Zero Option, provided equal worldwide limits, exclusion of British and French systems, and a temporary cap of 450 deployed INF warheads.
Soviet Response (Early 1983): Demanded a block on all US INF deployments in Europe, inclusion of aircraft, and consideration of third-party forces.

Negotiations stalled in November 1983 after the first US Pershing II missiles arrived in West Germany, leading the Soviet Union to walk out of talks.

Renewed Dialogue (1985-1987)

Negotiations resumed in March 1986, broadening to include Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and space issues. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue between Reagan and the new Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's January 1986 proposal for a global ban on all nuclear weapons by 2000, including INF missiles in Europe, was met with skepticism by the US as a public relations maneuver.

US Counter-Proposal: A phased reduction of INF launchers in Europe and Asia, aiming for zero by 1989, without imposing constraints on British and French nuclear forces.
Reykjavík Summit (Oct 1986): A pivotal meeting where Reagan and Gorbachev agreed in principle to remove INF systems from Europe and establish equal global limits of 100 INF missile warheads.
German Concession (Aug 1987): West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's decision to remove the joint US-West German Pershing 1a systems significantly advanced the treaty's prospects, overcoming initial resistance.

The treaty text was finalized in September 1987 and formally signed in Washington on December 8, 1987, marking a monumental achievement in Cold War diplomacy.

Treaty Content

Core Provisions

The INF Treaty was remarkably comprehensive in its prohibitions. It explicitly banned both the United States and the Soviet Union from possessing, producing, or flight-testing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310–3,420 miles). This ban also extended to the ground-based launchers designed for these missiles. A critical aspect was its application to both nuclear and conventional warheads, ensuring a broad scope of disarmament for these specific weapon categories.

Verification and Withdrawal

To ensure compliance, the treaty mandated the destruction of all existing prohibited weapons and established a rigorous protocol for mutual on-site inspections. This unprecedented level of transparency was a cornerstone of the agreement. Furthermore, the treaty included a clause allowing either party to withdraw with six months' notice if "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests," a provision that would later become central to its dissolution.

Implementation & Legacy

Missile Destruction

By the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991, both the United States and the Soviet Union had successfully destroyed a total of 2,692 prohibited weapons. The US eliminated 846 missiles, while the Soviet Union destroyed 1,846. This included a range of specific missile types and their associated launcher and transporter systems.

United States:

BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (decommissioned)
Pershing 1a (decommissioned)
Pershing II (decommissioned)

Soviet Union (by NATO reporting name):

SS-4 Sandal (decommissioned)
SS-5 Skean (decommissioned)
SS-12 Scaleboard (decommissioned)
SS-20 Saber (decommissioned)
SS-23 Spider (decommissioned)
SSC-X-4 Slingshot

Post-Soviet Continuity

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the United States engaged with the newly independent states to ensure the continuity of arms control obligations. While the immediate focus was on the START I treaty, efforts were also made to maintain the INF Treaty. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine formally agreed to continue fulfilling the treaty's terms. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan participated passively due to the presence of single inspection sites within their borders. On-site inspections continued until May 31, 2001, as stipulated by the 13-year inspection agreement. After this period, both the US and Russia continued to exchange national technical means of verification and notifications, and Special Verification Committees met regularly, with the final meeting in November 2016.

Allegations of Violations

Russian Concerns and Accusations

In February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly questioned the INF Treaty's relevance, arguing it unfairly restricted only Russia and the US while other nations developed similar capabilities. The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Yuri Baluyevsky, even suggested a unilateral withdrawal in response to NATO's missile defense system deployment in Europe. US officials later accused Russia of violating the treaty in 2008 by testing the SSC-8 cruise missile, which they claimed had a range of 3,000 km. Russia, however, maintained the SSC-8's maximum range was only 480 km, thus not violating the treaty. Further US allegations in 2013, 2014, and 2017 pointed to Russian testing of the SS-25 and RS-26 ICBMs in ways that could breach the agreement.

US Actions Under Scrutiny

Conversely, Russian officials and some American academics, such as Theodore Postol, argued that the US deployment of its missile defense system in Europe constituted a treaty violation. They contended that these systems could be quickly retrofitted with offensive capabilities. This claim was consistently rejected by US and NATO officials, including academic Jeffrey Lewis. Russian experts also raised concerns that US target missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-4 Triton violated the treaty, an accusation also denied by US officials. These mutual accusations highlighted a growing distrust and differing interpretations of the treaty's boundaries.

The China Factor

Beyond the bilateral US-Russia disputes, the non-participation of China in the INF Treaty emerged as a significant concern. As early as 2011, analysts like Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute noted that China's unconstrained buildup of intermediate-range forces posed a problem for Russia. This concern was echoed by US officials, including those from the Obama administration, who observed China's ability to operate outside the treaty's restrictions. The deployment of China's DF-26 IRBM, with a range of 4,000 km, capable of threatening US forces as far as Guam, further intensified these anxieties and became a key justification for the eventual US withdrawal.

Withdrawal & Termination

US Announcement and Russian Response

On October 20, 2018, US President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the INF Treaty, primarily citing Russia's persistent non-compliance, particularly with the SSC-8 missile. This decision also aimed to address China's unconstrained missile development in the Pacific. In response, President Putin declared that Russia would not initiate a nuclear conflict but would "annihilate" any adversary, invoking the concept of "Mutually Assured Destruction." He also stated that Russians killed in such a conflict "will go to heaven as martyrs."

The Countdown to Collapse

The US formally suspended its compliance with the treaty on February 2, 2019, initiating a six-month period for Russia to return to compliance. Russia swiftly followed suit the next day, announcing its own suspension of the treaty as a "mirror response." During this period, Russia began developing new intermediate-range hypersonic missiles and land-based 3M-54 Kalibr systems, which are nuclear-capable. Despite a summit on January 30, 2019, failing to preserve the treaty, Russia attempted to demonstrate the 9M729 (SSC-8) missile to foreign military attachés, an offer the US declined, citing inability to verify its true range.

Formal End and Aftermath

The United States officially withdrew from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stating that "Russia is solely responsible for the treaty's demise." This withdrawal, backed by most NATO allies who cited Russian non-compliance, paved the way for the US Department of Defense to announce plans for testing new missile types previously prohibited. On August 18, 2019, the US conducted a test firing of a ground-based Tomahawk cruise missile, a system similar to those banned by the treaty. Russia's foreign ministry expressed regret, accusing the US of escalating military tensions. President Putin declared on August 5, 2019, that "the INF Treaty no longer exists... a thing of the past," and Russia announced it would no longer abide by the treaty as of August 4, 2025. This period also saw the development and deployment of the Typhon Medium Range Capability weapon system by the US in 2023.

Reactions & Implications

Concerns from Arms Control Experts

The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty drew significant criticism from prominent nuclear arms control experts, including George Shultz, Richard Lugar, and Sam Nunn, who urged the Trump administration to preserve the agreement. Mikhail Gorbachev, a signatory to the original treaty, sharply criticized Trump's decision as "not the work of a great mind" and warned of a "new arms race." Leaders of the US House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, Eliot Engel and Adam Smith, argued that the withdrawal inadvertently played into Russia's hands by offering an easy exit from its treaty obligations.

International Perspectives

While most NATO allies supported the US withdrawal, acknowledging years of Russian non-compliance, some European members initially urged the US to seek Russia's return to compliance rather than abandoning the treaty. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg suggested the possibility of expanding the INF Treaty to include other nuclear powers like China and India, an idea that both the US and Russia had shown some openness to, though Russia expressed skepticism about its feasibility. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, for its part, warned of negative impacts from a unilateral US withdrawal and urged the US to "think thrice before acting."

Ukraine's Stance and Broader Context

In March 2019, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry asserted its right to develop intermediate-range missiles following the treaty's collapse, citing Russian aggression and the presence of Russian Iskander-M systems in annexed Crimea as serious threats. This highlighted how the treaty's demise could lead to regional arms buildups. Brazilian journalist Augusto Dall'Agnol noted that the INF Treaty's termination should be viewed within the broader context of a gradual erosion of the strategic arms control regime, which began with the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, despite Russian objections. This suggests a long-term trend away from established arms limitation frameworks.

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References

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance, Arms Control Association, August 2019.

"Senate Votes 93-5 to Approve Ratification of the INF Treaty", CQ Weekly Report 42#22 (1988): 1431â35.

A full list of references for this article are available at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Wikipedia page

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Echoes of Détente: The INF Treaty's Rise and Fall

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The INF Treaty 📜

🤝 A Landmark Agreement

🚫 Scope of Prohibition

📉 Elimination and Expiration

📊 Treaty Overview

Historical Background 🌍

🚀 The SS-20 Catalyst

🛡️ NATO's Double-Track Decision

The Negotiation Process 🤝

🧊 Early Standoffs (1981-1983)

🕊️ Renewed Dialogue (1985-1987)

Treaty Content 📝

📜 Core Provisions

🔍 Verification and Withdrawal

Implementation & Legacy ✅

🛠️ Missile Destruction

United States:

Soviet Union (by NATO reporting name):

🔄 Post-Soviet Continuity

Allegations of Violations 🚫

🇷🇺 Russian Concerns and Accusations

🇺🇸 US Actions Under Scrutiny

🇨🇳 The China Factor

Withdrawal & Termination 💔

📢 US Announcement and Russian Response

⏳ The Countdown to Collapse

🔚 Formal End and Aftermath

Reactions & Implications 🗣️

📉 Concerns from Arms Control Experts

🌐 International Perspectives

🇺🇦 Ukraine's Stance and Broader Context

Teacher's Corner 🧑‍🏫

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Gamer's Corner 🎮

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References

📜 References

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📜 Important Notice

Dive in with Flashcard Learning!

The INF Treaty

A Landmark Agreement

Scope of Prohibition

Elimination and Expiration

Treaty Overview

Historical Background

The SS-20 Catalyst

NATO's Double-Track Decision

The Negotiation Process

Early Standoffs (1981-1983)

Renewed Dialogue (1985-1987)

Treaty Content

Core Provisions

Verification and Withdrawal

Implementation & Legacy

Missile Destruction

Post-Soviet Continuity

Allegations of Violations

Russian Concerns and Accusations

US Actions Under Scrutiny

The China Factor

Withdrawal & Termination

US Announcement and Russian Response

The Countdown to Collapse

Formal End and Aftermath

Reactions & Implications

Concerns from Arms Control Experts

International Perspectives

Ukraine's Stance and Broader Context

Teacher's Corner

True or False?

Test Your Knowledge!

Gamer's Corner

Discover other topics to study!

References

Feedback & Support

Disclaimer

Important Notice