The Rhineland Gambit
Examining the 1936 reoccupation and its pivotal role in the road to World War II.
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Overview
The Event
The remilitarisation of the Rhineland, known in German as Rheinlandbesetzung, commenced on March 7, 1936. On this day, military forces of Nazi Germany entered the Rhineland, a region that had been demilitarised following World War I. This action constituted a direct violation of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties.
Treaty Violations
The Treaty of Versailles (Articles 42, 43, and 44) explicitly forbade Germany from maintaining or constructing any fortifications west of the Rhine or within 50 kilometers east of it. The 1925 Locarno Treaties further reaffirmed this permanently demilitarised status. Hitler's move directly contravened these foundational agreements that aimed to secure peace in Europe.
Allied Inaction
Neither France nor Britain, the primary guarantors of the treaties, were prepared for a military response. Public and elite opinion in both nations strongly opposed intervention. This lack of decisive action by the Western democracies is widely seen by historians as a critical missed opportunity to halt Hitler's aggressive foreign policy early on.
Historical Context
Post-WWI Settlements
Following World War I, the Rhineland was placed under Allied occupation. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) imposed severe restrictions on Germany, including the demilitarisation of the Rhineland to serve as a buffer zone and security measure for France and Belgium. The last Allied troops withdrew in June 1930, following negotiations by German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann.
The Locarno Treaties
Signed in October 1925, the Locarno Treaties represented a voluntary German acceptance of the demilitarised status of the Rhineland, seen as a more palatable alternative to the imposed terms of Versailles. These treaties aimed to foster stability and cooperation, with Britain and Italy vaguely guaranteeing the Franco-German and Belgian-German borders.
German Rearmament and Ambitions
After the Nazi regime came to power in 1933, Germany began a systematic process of rearmament, openly challenging the Versailles restrictions. Military and diplomatic elites viewed the demilitarised Rhineland as a temporary impediment, planning its remilitarisation for when the diplomatic climate allowed. This move was seen as a crucial step towards achieving Germany's broader territorial ambitions, particularly Lebensraum in Eastern Europe.
The Decision to Remilitarise
Hitler's Motivations
Hitler accelerated his plans for remilitarisation from 1937 to 1936. Key factors included the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance (which Germany claimed violated Locarno), political instability in France, Germany's economic pressures, and the weakening of the Stresa Front due to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia. Hitler sought to exploit these international divisions.
Internal Deliberations
German military leaders, like General Ludwig Beck, warned of the army's unpreparedness for conflict with France. However, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, supported by Joachim von Ribbentrop, advocated for immediate action, providing justifications based on the Franco-Soviet pact. Neurath's confident assurances, partly based on intelligence suggesting French inaction, played a significant role in Hitler's final decision.
Intelligence and Timing
Intelligence reports, some perhaps exaggerated or misinterpreted, suggested that France and Britain would not respond militarily. Hitler's decision was also influenced by the ongoing Abyssinia Crisis, which diverted international attention. The timing was crucial, aiming to present a fait accompli before potential opposition could materialise effectively.
The March into the Rhineland
Deployment
On March 7, 1936, approximately nineteen German infantry battalions, supported by a small contingent of aircraft, entered the Rhineland. German troops crossed the Rhine river, establishing a presence that directly violated the treaty provisions. This move was carefully orchestrated to coincide with diplomatic announcements.
Hitler's Address
Simultaneously, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, announcing the remilitarisation. He framed the action as a defensive measure against the perceived threat of the Franco-Soviet pact and a necessary step to restore German honour and equality. He offered to rejoin the League of Nations and proposed a 25-year non-aggression pact with Britain and France.
German Reception
The remilitarisation was met with widespread jubilation across Germany. Crowds in cities like Cologne greeted the troops with flowers and blessings. Hitler's defiance of the Versailles Treaty resonated deeply with the German populace, boosting his popularity and reinforcing the perception of his infallibility among many.
International Reactions
France
France, despite possessing a superior military force, hesitated. Economic crises, military assessments of potential war costs, and a lack of British support contributed to paralysis. The French government, fearing escalation and domestic instability, ultimately chose not to enforce the treaties militarily.
United Kingdom
Britain's policy was largely one of appeasement. Public opinion was strongly against another war, and many believed the Treaty of Versailles was overly harsh. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin cited resource limitations and public sentiment as reasons against military intervention. The Dominions also signaled reluctance to support military action.
Belgium
Belgium, previously allied with France, reasserted its neutrality. King Leopold III declared a policy exclusively focused on keeping Belgium outside the quarrels of its neighbours, effectively abandoning its alliance with France and relying on its own neutrality.
Poland
Poland assured France of its commitment to the Franco-Polish alliance but ambiguously indicated it would only act if France was invaded. Poland's stance suggested a lack of confidence in France's ability to deter Germany, and it abstained from voting for sanctions against Germany in the League of Nations.
United States
The U.S. maintained a strict isolationist stance, taking a "hands off" approach. President Roosevelt's absence during the crisis underscored the nation's desire to avoid European entanglements.
Soviet Union
Publicly, the Soviets denounced Germany's actions as a threat to peace. However, privately, Soviet diplomats signaled a desire for better commercial and political relations with Germany, indicating a complex and opportunistic foreign policy.
League of Nations
The League of Nations declared the remilitarisation a breach of treaties but proved ineffective. Only the Soviet Union advocated for sanctions, but widespread economic dependence on Germany and a lack of consensus prevented any meaningful action. The League's failure highlighted its diminishing influence.
Aftermath and Consequences
Shift in Power Balance
The remilitarisation decisively shifted the balance of power in Europe towards Germany. France's credibility as a security guarantor was severely undermined, impacting its alliances in Eastern Europe. The inability to enforce treaty obligations exposed the weakness of the post-WWI security architecture.
Emboldened Hitler
The success of the Rhineland gambit significantly boosted Hitler's confidence and prestige. It demonstrated that the Western powers were unwilling to confront him militarily, encouraging him to pursue further aggressive expansionist policies, accelerating the path towards World War II.
Strategic Realignment
Germany began constructing the Siegfried Line along its western border, solidifying its defensive capabilities. The failure of France and Britain to act prompted countries like Belgium to revert to neutrality and encouraged Eastern European states to reconsider their alliances, seeking accommodation with the ascendant Germany.
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References
References
- Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jack S. Levy, "The preventive war that never happened: Britain, France, and the rise of Germany in the 1930s." Security Studies 16.1 (2007): 32-67.
- Müller, Klaus Jürgen The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933â1945, Manchester University Press, 1987, p. 48.
- Arthur Harris echoed this in 1945, reminiscent of Otto von Bismarck's statement about the Balkans.
- Bennett, Edward German Rearmament and the West, 1932â1933, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015 page 109
- Sullivan, Barry "More than meets the eye: the Ethiopian War and the Origins of the Second World War" pages 178â203 from The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians, London: Routledge, 1999 page 179
- Neville, Peter Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War, London: A&C Black, 2006 page 138
- Crozier, Andrew Appeasement and Germany's Last Bid for Colonies Macmillan Press: London, 1988 p. 33.
- Bartov, Omer "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich" pages 133â150 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 pages 137â139 & 144â146
- Bartov, Omer "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich" pages 133â150 from The Third Reich The Essential Readings edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwell, 1999 pages 138â139.
- Goda, Norman "Black Marks: Hitler's Bribery of his Senior Officers During World War II" from pages 96â137 from Corrupt Histories, Toronto: Hushion House edited by Emmanuel Kreike, & William Chester Jordan, 2005 page 102
- William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary, ©1941, reprinted 2011 by RosettaBooks, entry for March 7, 1936
- William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary, ©1941, reprinted 2011 by RosettaBooks, entry for March 7, 1936
- House of Commons, July 27, 1936: https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debate/?id=1936-07-27a.1207.1
- Harold Nicolson, The Harold Nicolson Diaries: 1919â1964 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), p. 139.
- Charles Cheney Hyde, 'Belgium and Neutrality', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 1. (January 1937), p. 82.
- Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security 1934â1938 (1984) p. 104.
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